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EGALITARIANISM AND THE WARREN COURTt 
Philip B. Kurland* 
As late as 1966, an English philosopher could say that the word 
fi "equality," unlike the words "freedom," "liberty," and "jus-
tice," was not a "value word" but only a descriptive one.1 He was 
not denigrating the term or the concept. He was saying that "when 
people talk about equality in a political or moral context what they 
really mean to talk about is some closely evaluative concept, such 
as impartiality or justice."2 What may have been true in England 
in 1966 was only partially true in the United States. While the word 
"equality" may still be used here to invoke other notions, it has 
now developed charisma-to use another word that became pop-
ular at the same time. Equality is the banner behind which there 
have been, both literally and figuratively, many marchers. In consti-
tutional terms, "equality" has become the first freedom.3 It is a 
goal-a value-in itself that, to many, needs little or no justifica-
tion. 
The difficulty, of course, is that, even if it is self-justifying, the 
concept is not self-defining. A century ago, Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen ·wrote that "equality is a word so wide and vague as to be 
by itself almost unmeaning .... "4 A plethora of recent literature 
on the subject confirms both Stephen's dictum and the widespread 
interest that has developed in the subject.5 These writings make it 
abundantly clear that there is vast disagreement about the word's 
t Copyright © 1970 by The University of Chicago. This Article was the basis 
for the fourth of the Thomas M. Cooley lectures delivered at The University of 
Michigan Law School on September 15-19, 1969, and will be one chapter in the 
forthcoming book, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court, to be published 
in fall 1970 by The University of Chicago Press. 
• Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B. 1942, University of Pennsylvania; 
LL.B. 1944, Harvard University.-Ed. 
1. J. WILSON, EQUALITY 17-18 (1966). Id. at 18: 
"[E]quality" is primarily at least, a descriptive and not an evaluative term. It 
may be more reasonable to suppose that equality is the corner-stone of a building 
whose more obvious features are made up of other political concepts; that the 
notion of equality, just because it is descriptive, is the essential point of depart-
ture of the road to liberalism. 
2, Id. at 19. 
S. See Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and 
Executive Branches of Government", 78 HARV. L. REY. 143 (1964). 
4. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY 201 (1873). 
5. See, e.g., A. GRIMES, EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1964); R. HAiuus, THE QUEST FOR 
EQUALITY (1960); s. LA.KOFF, EQUALITY IN PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY (1964); NoMOS IX: 
EQUALITY ij. Pennock&: J. Chapman ed. 1967); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (en-
larged ed. 1965); J. WILSON, supra note 1. 
[629] 
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connotations. If it is "value free," it nevertheless engenders much ex-
citement among both its proponents and its opponents. Indeed, the 
time has come when to speak out against "equality" is to invite the 
same reaction as once was evoked by condemning Prohibition. 
For my purposes, I prefer to accept the suggestion made by Chief 
Judge Cardozo almost fifty years ago, when a different demand for 
equality was filling the air-a demand for equality of bargaining 
power to combat the constitutional concept of freedom of contract. 
He said then: "The same fluid and dynamic conception which un-
derlies the modern notion of liberty, as secured to the individual 
by constitutional immunity, must also underlie the cognate notion 
of equality."6 Like the due process clause, the equal protection 
clause, which must bear most of the burden for translating the var-
ious notions of equality into constitutional sanctions, must be rec-
ognized as "fluid and dynamic." Certainly such a reading leads to 
a broad judicial authority. At the same time, it might be noted that 
the background for Cardozo's statement was provided by Coppage 
v. Kansas,1 a knowledge of which might give rise to some arguments 
for judicial restraint. 
There are those, including some who have served on the Warren 
Court, who have found justification for the contemporary egalitar-
ianism in the origins of the Constitution. For the most part, this 
attitude has been based on what Professor Alfred Kelly has appro-
priately termed "law office" history.8 It was just such history, history 
that asks too much justification from the past, that Justice Goldberg 
was relying on both in his 1964 Madison lecture9 and in his 1964 
opinion in Bell v. Maryland,10 which read very much alike. He as-
serted "that equality and liberty were the 'twin themes' of the Amer-
ican Revolution."11 Liberty and equality may well have been themes 
struck by some of the revolutionaries, but certainly not liberty or 
equality as their advocates presently conceive them. Justice Gold-
6. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 81-82 (1921). 
7. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state statute forbidding an agent of any employer from 
coercing, requiring, demanding, or influencing any person to enter an agreement 
not to join a labor organization held to violate the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment). 
8. Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 119, 122. 
9. Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 205 (1964). The April 
dateline on the issue of the review in which Justice Goldberg's lecture appeared is 
reminiscent of the T. S. Eliot's lines: "April is the cruellest month ••• mixing Memory 
and desire." The Waste Land, in COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 37 (1958). 
10. 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964). The lecture was delivered on February 11, 1964; the 
opinion came down on June 22, 1964. 
11. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 205. 
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berg did concede that equality was not mentioned in the Consti-
tution. But this was due, he stated, to the fact that the founders 
"naturally assumed [that equality] was encompassed within the con-
cept of liberty whose blessings they heralded in the preamble to 
the Constitution and later specifically guaranteed in the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment.''12 The character of his argu-
ment was best revealed when he invoked Magna Carta as providing 
one of the traditions of equality on which the American Revolution 
rested. Magna Carta may have become a noble myth,13 but the no-
tion that King John and the barons were concerned about their 
equality with the people would be difficult to justify.14 
Of course, there is evidence that some kinds of equality were 
sought to be achieved at Philadelphia in 1787, and, as Goldberg 
noted, some are in fact stated in the Constitution. He found solace, 
for example, in the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, 
which equated citizens of one state with citizens of the other states. 
But as to who were citizens, the Constitution was silent. Even the 
privileges and immunities provided, to the extent they were defined, 
seem trivial when compared with the egalitarian aspirations of to-
day.15 Goldberg also referred to article IV's guarantee of a repub-
lican form of government. But he did not talk about the limited 
franchise then available in most jurisdictions, the structure of the 
upper houses of the state legislatures, or of the elitist character of 
the United States Senate. 
One can find forms of equality everywhere, if those are what 
he is looking for. At the Convention itself, Benjamin Franklin sug-
gested that the pressure for a monarchy was based on the desire for 
equality. He said that "there is a natural inclination in mankind 
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them of Aristocratic 
domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It 
gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that 
they like."16 Indeed, the distinction between equality and the ap-
pearance of equality is an important one, as we have come to learn. 
The Constitution did abolish titles of nobility, and its provi-
sion in article I, section 9, for the apportionment of direct taxes 
12. Id. at 207. 
13. See s. THORNE, A. DUNHAM, P. KURLAND &: I. JENNINGS, THE GREAT CHARTER 
48-74 (1965). 
14. The arguments about, and the ambiguities of, Magna Carta have been can-
vassed in J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (1965). 
15. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
16. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 83 (rev. ed. M. Farrand 
1937) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
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was also egalitarian in its direction. So, too, were the abolition of 
bills of attainder and the ban on a religious test for office. Even the 
necessary and proper clause and the supremacy clause might be con-
strued as egalitarian, insofar as they contribute to a national uni-
formity of applicable rules of law. 
The sticking point always comes with the recognition that the 
Constitution also dealt with slavery. Justice Goldberg disposed of 
that problem in this way: 
In sum, then, the Constitution of the new nation, while heralding 
liberty, in effect declared all men to be free and equal-except black 
men, who were to be neither free nor equal. This inconsistency re-
flected a fundamental departure from the American creed, a de-
parture which it took a civil war to set right.17 
Which was the creed and which the aberration appears to have 
been easier for Justice Goldberg to be sure of than it is for many 
historians, professional as well as amateur. Nor did the Civil War 
''set [it] right." 
At the time of the Revolution, however much one man was the 
equal of the other, it was not thought to be the role of government 
to effect that equality. It was expected only that the government 
would treat one man as it would another. But that meaning of 
equality is a far cry from the one that the Warren Court con-
fronted. A description of the Revolutionary scene more fitted to 
the facts and less to the wish may be found in Professor John 
Roche's remarks: 
If one were to have the temerity to translate this portion of The 
Declaration [of Independence] into operational political theory, a 
different proposition would emerge-the proposition which, I sub-
mit, is basic to an understanding of the development of equality 
in America over the past three centuries. It would run roughly as 
follows-all those who have been admitted to membership by the 
political community are equal. In other words, men achieve equality 
as a function of membership in the body politic-and this member-
ship is not an inherent right, but a privilege which the majority 
accords on its own terms. 
The myth of the libertarian past dies hard, but if we are going 
to grasp historical reality, we must once and for all lay to rest the 
notion that our forefathers built a pluralistic society around the 
principles of liberty and equality.is 
The phrase in the Declaration of Independence to which Pro-
17. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 208. 
18. Equality in America: The Expansion of a Concept, 43 N.C. L. R.Ev. 249, 251-52 
(1965). 
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fessor Roche referred-that "all men are created equal"-has been 
the keystone on which the myth has been built by the Justices of 
the Warren Court, both on and off the bench.19 But the phrase 
took hold, so far as I know, only orice in the early history of this 
country: in the 1783 Massachusetts case of Quock Walker v. Na-
thaniel ]ennings,20 the opinion in which did not see the light of 
day until 1874. Furthermore, the Declaration's assertion of the 
equal rights of all men referred only to their rights "to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness," and it is doubtful that it encompas-
sed any more. In any event, this happy phrase-"all men are cre-
ated equal"-saw no consequence in the Constitution.21 
It is far easier to accept the proposition that the founders con-
templated an open society than it is to argue that they anticipated 
a classless one. Pinckney certainly spoke for an open society at the 
Convention when he said: 
The people of the U. States are perhaps the most singular of any 
we are acquainted with. Among them there are fewer distinctions 
of fortune & less of rank, than among the inhabitants of any other 
nation. Every freeman has a right to the same protection & security; 
and a very moderate share of property entitles them to the possession 
of all the honors and privileges the public can bestow: hence arises 
a greater equality, than is to be found among the people of any 
other country, and an equality which is more likely to continue-I 
say this equality is likely to continue, because in a new Country, 
possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every tempta-
tion is offered to emigration & where industry must be rewarded 
with competency, there will be few poor, and few dependent-Every 
member of the Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving 
at the supreme offices & consequently of directing the strength & 
sentiments of the whole Community. None will be excluded by 
birth, & few by fortune, from voting for proper persons to fill the 
offices of Government-the whole community will enjoy in the fullest 
sense that kind of political liberty which consists in the power the 
members of the State reserve to themselves, of arriving at the public 
offices, or at least, of having votes in the nomination of those who fill 
them.22 
This was the attitude of one whom Professor Morgenthau has 
labeled an outstanding egalitarian of his time.23 There is some evi-
dence, however, of a similar attitude in the expressed views of Alex-
19. See notes 9-10 supra. 
20. See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HtsrOllY 110 (8th ed. H. Commager 1968). 
21. St:e c. BECKEll, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDEN<:2 234 (reprint ed. 1942). 
22. 1 Farrand, supra note 16, at 398. 
23. St:e H. MOllGENTHAU, THE PUIU'OS!!: OF AMERICAN POLITICS 11-18 (1960). 
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antler Hamilton, who hardly can be characterized in the same way. 
For example, as Professor Rossiter has pointed out: 
Article II, section 1 of [Hamilton's] draft constitution placed the 
vote for members of the House in "the free male citizens and in-
habitants of the several States comprehended in the Union, all of 
whom, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards shall be entitled 
to an equal vote." Other articles set a modest property qualification 
for voters in senatorial and presidential elections, and this may be 
an accurate measure of how far Hamilton was prepared to go in 
making popular government truly popular. "While he welcomed some 
political democracy in his ideal polity, he certainly did not want it to 
take command. 24 
If the Warren Court's egalitarian bent cannot find specific jus-
tification in the language or history of the Constitution as origi-
nally framed, it is equally bereft of assistance from the history and 
purpose of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the place at which the doctrine of equality specifically en-
tered constitutional language .. Again, however, the Warren Court 
preferred to indulge its liking for rewriting history. In Brown v. 
Board of Education,25 the unanimous Court took solace in the am-
biguity of the amendment's history. Since that time, however, a 
divided Court has purported to resolve contemporary problems by 
finding words here and there in congressional debates and reports 
or in polemical writings of that time and this. 26 
There are few things in the history of the equal protection 
clause that are clear. One is that it was aimed at the destruction of 
the Black Codes of the South. A second is that it, along with other 
provisions of the fourteenth amendment, was intended to protect 
the terms of the 1866 Civil Rights Act against judicial invalidation 
and legislative repeal. How far beyond legislative and administra-
tive discrimination which is openly based on race the amendment 
was intended to go cannot be told from the language or spirit of 
24. C. ROSSITER, .Al.ExANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 158-59 (1964). Pinckney 
had also proposed a property requirement for office holders-not less than $50,000 for 
legislators and judges and not less than $100,000 for the executive. 2 Farrand, supra 
note 16, at 248. This proposal may have been foresighted, but it was hardly egalitarian. 
25. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Seg-
regation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1955). 
26. See, e.g., Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. IOI; 
Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1961: "But Answer Came There None", 1964 SuP. CT. 
REv. 137; Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" To Vote, and the 
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 33; Kelly, supra note 
8, at 142-49; Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal 
Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 39. The relevant cases and the vast literature on the 
subject may be garnered from the footnotes in these articles. 
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the times. Nor is the intended scope of the 1866 Act clear from the 
legislative history either of the Act or of the amendment.27 But, as 
Dean Francis Allen has stated in his summary of the role of the 
fourteenth amendment, 
the great moral imperatives of due process and equal protection 
could not be confined to their historical understandings when ap-
plied to the emerging issues of modern American life. There is 
evidence that those who drafted Section 1 intended that the mean-
ings of these phrases should evolve and expand with the passage of 
time and changes of circumstance.28 
If the legislative history and the language of the fourteenth 
amendment's equal protection clause afforded scant support to the 
Warren Court's resolution of the specific -problems that came be-
fore it, little more solace could have been gained from that kind 
of history in which the Court is supposed to be expert-earlier 
decisions construing the clause. The prime limitation on the ap-
plication of the clause-that it barred only state action-was estab-
lished early29 and had not yet been rejected by the time of Warren's 
accession to the bench, although it may have been seriously under-
mined by Shelley v. Kraemer.80 On the other hand, the equal pro-
tection clause itself had been expanded in a direction uncalled for 
by either its history or its language. In the Slaughter-House Cases,31 
with a prescience that the New Yorker usually takes note of under 
the rubric "The Clouded Crystal Ball," the Court expressed doubt 
that "any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination 
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever 
be held to come within the purview of this provision."32 It would 
have been better had this focus been maintained. As it turned out, 
for most of the amendment's history, Negroes were only inciden-
tally afforded the benefits of the clause. In part, this anomaly oc-
curred because the judicial process is not self-starting. Except in 
criminal cases, it takes an interested person with adequate resources 
27. See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. Cr. 
R.Ev. 89. 
28. The Constitution: The Civil War Amendments: XIII-XV, in 1 D. BoORS11N, 
AN AMERICAN PRIMER 165 (1966). 
29. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 
339 (1880); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For the strongest argument advanced 
on behalf of the abolition of the restriction, at least in race relations cases, see Black, 
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. R.Ev. 69 
(1967). 
30. 334 U.S. I, 22 (1948). 
31. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81. 
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to initiate and carry on judicial proceedings to protect his rights. 
Unlike the Chinese in California,83 Negroes as a class could not 
secure their rights judicially before they had the resources to sup-
port litigation or legislation, and they could not get the resources 
before they had secured their rights. But the early cases hardly in-
dicate a certainty of much success even if they had had the oppor-
tunity to utilize the courts freely. 
The nadir of protection for Negroes came in 1883, with the 
invalidation of congressional legislation in the Civil Rights Cases.84 
Thereafter, although moving with all the deliberate speed of a 
glacier, the Court proceeded in the right direction. From the be-
ginning, the Court, with the support of Congress, was prepared to 
confer on Negroes the dubious privilege of serving on juries.85 Zon-
ing Ia--tvs providing for segregation of neighborhoods were inval-
idated in 1917.86 And racially restrictive covenants became unen-
forceable in 1948, thanks to Shelley v. Kraemer.87 
On the other hand, the Court borrowed from Massachusetts38 
the "separate but equal" doctrine and applied it both to transpor-
tation facilities39 and to education40 whence it had come. But the 
doctrine had been-if I may use the word-disintegrating in both 
of these areas long before the era of the Warren Court.41 Still, the 
use of the equal protection clause to protect the political rights of 
Negroes was essentially abortive,42 until the cases dealing with all-
33. The very large number of cases in which the Chinese attempted to use the 
courts-often successfully-for the protection of their legal and constitutional rights is 
detailed at length in H.N. Janish, The Chinese, the Courts, and the Constitution 
(1969) (dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the J.S.D. 
degree, on file in the library of The Law School, University of Chicago). 
34. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
35. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 
(1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Patton 
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Avery v. 
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). 
36. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60. 
37. 334 U.S. 1 (unenforceable in state courts); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) 
(unenforceable in the District of Columbia). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 
(1953). 
38. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 209 (1849). See also People ex rel. King 
v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883). 
39. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
40. Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v. 
Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
41. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); cf. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 
(1946); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
42. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); 
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). But see Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 
347 (1915) (grandfather clause invalidated). 
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white primaries came before the Court.43 In sum, prior to 1954, 
the equal protection clause had not been effectively used by the 
Court for the protection of Negro rights, although by that year the 
climate had changed and a recognition of this function was begin-
ning to be acknowledged. 
Other minorities did not fare much better under the equal pro-
tection clause even though the Chinese had successfully evoked the 
classic decision of Yick Wo v. Hopkins: 44 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in its ap-
pearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority 
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make 
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circum-
stances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is . . . 
within the prohibition of the Constitution.45 
This case left the Court with a powerful doctrine for the restraint 
of state power, but it did not say on whose behalf that doctrine 
would be used. As it turned out, the doctrine was not used to pro-
tect other racial minorities, as is evidenced by the Japanese exclu-
sion cases;46 nor was it used to protect women47 or aliens.48 But, 
at least as to the Japanese-Americans and the aliens, the trend in 
the other direction had started before 1954.49 
To the extent that it performed any function, the equal protec-
tion clause was a supplementary device for protecting business ac-
tivities against state exercises of police50 and taxing>1 powers. With 
the ipse dixit that corporations are "persons" protected by the equal 
43. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); 
cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
44. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
45. 118 U.S. at 373-74. 
46. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944). See E. Ros-row, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, in 
THE SoVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 193 (1962). The argument that the equal protection clause 
is not applicable to the national government is effectively answered by Hurd v. Hodge, 
334 U.S. 24 (1948), and by Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
47. See, e.g., Goessaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
48. See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Terrace v. Thomp-
son, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 
U.S. 175 (1915); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 1!18 (1914). 
49. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commn., 334 
U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
50. See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 
(1937): Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 
553 (1931). 
51. See, e.g., Valentine v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936); Stewart Dry 
Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935); Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 
535 (1934); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933); Quaker City Cab Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); 
Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910). 
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protection clause, 112 Chief Justice White made them the primary 
beneficiaries of that provision. But essentially, the clause was only 
a tail to the due process kite, as was implicit in Justice Holmes' 
remark in Buck v. Bell that the equal protection clause was the 
"usual last resort of constitutional arguments."113 With the decline 
of substantive due process in the economic realm114 went the fall of 
the equal protection clause in the same area. It is clear, then, that 
prior to the Warren Court, the equal protection clause was not a 
strong element in the Supreme Court's arsenal. The egalitarian 
movement was not yet a part of the American Zeitgeist. But equal-
ity was beginning to cast its shadow. Its entrance on the scene at 
center stage was heralded by Brown v. Board of Education.55 
It was appropriate that the resurrection of the equal protection 
clause should be the result of the Negro Revolution of the 1950's 
and 1960's. Indeed, in a way, Chief Justice Warren was wrong when 
he suggested in Brown that the Court could not tum back the 
clock. For the Court was doing exactly that. It was returning to a 
recognition of the central purpose of the equal protection clause-
to protect Negroes from discrimination at the hands of legislative, 
administrative, and judicial bodies controlled by white majorities. 
It was a return to the understanding of the Slaughter-House Cases 
as to the use for which the clause was framed. What could not be 
done was to treat the problems as the Court might have treated 
them earlier, under different circumstances, in an essentially differ-
ent society. 
Certainly the central problem of equality in this country has 
always concerned the Negro's right of access to American society. 
This fact was recognized early by Tocqueville156 and too late by 
Myrdal.117 By 1954, the resolution of the American dilemma had 
been postponed until it could be postponed no longer. If other gov-
ernmental bodies did not see this necessity, at least the Supreme 
Court's eyes were open. 
In 1835, Tocqueville anticipated the problem with which the 
52. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., ll8 U.S. 394 (1866). But m: 
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (Justice Black, 
dissenting); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-80 (1949) (Justice 
Douglas, dissenting). 
53. 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
54. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: .d.n Exhumation and 
Reburial, 1962 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 34. 
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
56. See text accompanying note 59 infra. 
57. l G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY xli-lv (1944). 
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country is now faced: "If ever America undergoes great revolu-
tions, they will be brought about by the presence of the black race 
on the soil of the United States: that is to say, they will owe their 
origins, not to the equality but to the inequality of condition."158 
Earlier in his epochal work he had written: 
As long as the Negro remains a slave, he may be kept in a con-
dition not far removed from that of the brutes; but with his liberty 
he cannot but acquire a degree of instruction that will enable him 
to appreciate his misfortunes and to discern a remedy for them. 
Moreover, there exists a singular principle of relative justice which 
is firmly implanted in the human heart. Men are much more forcibly 
struck by those inequalities which exist within the same class than 
by those which may be noted between different classes. One can un-
derstand slavery, but how allow several millions of citizens to exist 
under a load of eternal infamy and hereditary wretchedness? . . . 
As soon as it is admitted that the whites and the emancipated 
blacks are placed upon the same territory in the situation of two 
foreign communities, it will be readily understood that there are 
but two chances for the future: the Negroes and the whites must 
either wholly part or wholly mingle .... I do not believe that the 
white and black races will ever live in any country upon an equal 
footing. But I believe the difficulty will be still greater in the United 
States than elsewhere.159 
It is not hard to understand why the problem was not faced be-
fore 1954. What is more difficult to comprehend is why it had to be 
faced in that year. The answer is probably contained in Tocque-
ville's statement. Despite the emancipation, it was not until the 
migration to the cities that the Negroes came face to face with the 
awful realities of discrimination, for the migration brought them 
close to, but not into, the community that the fourteenth amend-
ment intended that they share. Why then was the central question 
posed in terms of public education? Essentially the answer is that 
that area is one of the last realms of state competence and is one, 
as the Supreme Court told us in the last term of the Warren Court, 
which is basic to many of the other disqualifications that are im-
posed on Negroes.60 
This Article deals with the Warren Court's desegregation cases 
in some detail, for they form the basis of its contributions to con-
58. 2 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN A.MERICA 256 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). 
59. 1 id. at 373. Tocqueville's doleful prediction was shared, as he remarked, by 
Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 373 n.46. 
60, See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test for voting 
held invalid because of prior educational deprivation). See also Gould, Racial Equality 
in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Burger Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 
237, 254.57 (1969). 
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temporary egalitarianism. At the core of this new constitutional 
jurisprudence are the school desegregation cases; then come cases 
that do not involve education; and the third layer is provided by 
the cases concerned with national legislation dealing with this in-
tractable problem. All of these cases demonstrate that rapid move-
ment toward equality of the races is not attainable through the 
judicial process. The Court has moved faster than society is pre-
pared to go. This is not to denigrate the Court's efforts. The goal 
is certainly closer than it would have been, and the situation is less 
explosive than it might have been, without the Court's efforts. We 
are, after all, dealing with problems of a social revolution, and 
such problems are not the usual grist for the judicial mill. 
Brown v. Board of Education opened a Pandora's box that was 
about to release its contents without judicial prying. What the en-
suing years were to reveal was essentially that the Court, by itself, 
is incapable of effecting fundamental changes in society. Of course, 
it can spark explosions. But the special problems of school integra-
tion have remained largely unchanged, with small exceptions like 
Berkeley, California, and Washington, D.C.;61 and they have done 
so even though the other branches of the national government 
have joined the attempt to bring about change. When counsel for 
the State of South Carolina suggested to the Supreme Court that 
it would take sixty to ninety years to bring public opinion around 
to acquiescence in school .desegregation,62 his statement sounded 
like forensic hyperbole. Today it has all the appearance of stark 
reality. 
The immediate result of the Brown decree was to shift the bat-
tlefield from the heights of the Supreme Court to the foxholes of 
the federal district courts.63 In 1958, the issue was back in the Su-
preme Court under highly explosive conditions. Cooper v. Aaron64 
arose out of a conflict between good and evil in the city of Little 
Rock, Arkansas. After the Brown decision, Little Rock's school 
board prepared a plan for the gradual integration of its school sys-
tem, although Arkansas had not been a party to the Brown litiga-
61. See J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 1 (1966); U.S. COMMN. 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 90-91 (1967). 
62 • .ARGUMENT: THE ORAL .ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. 
BoARD OF EouCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 412, 419-21 (L. Friedman ed. 1969). This 
suggestion was made during the 1955 reargument of Briggs v. Elliott, which was 
decided with Brown, when the Court was considering the appropriate remedy to grant 
in these cases. 
63. See J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN (1961). 
64. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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tion and was not subject to the Brown decree. The plan called for 
the integration of the upper grades at the outset and annual addi-
tions of immediately lower grades until the entire program was 
covered. Some Negro citizens of Little Rock complained in a suit 
in the district court that the plan was too gradual, and they sought 
a decree ordering an increased pace. The trial court declined this 
relief and approved the plan,65 and its decision was affirmed by the 
United States Court of Appeals.66 At the state level, however, a 
razorback governor, with the unlikely name of Orville Faubus, led 
an insurrection against the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. In 
1956, the Arkansas constitution was amended to call for resistance 
to Brown, .and legislation was enacted by which it was hoped to 
prevent desegregation. Nevertheless, the city of Little Rock, cogni-
zant of the meaning of the Constitution's supremacy clause, pro-
ceeded with its plan. 
The day before the first Negroes were to enter a previously 
white high school in Little Rock, Faubus sent national-guard troops 
to prevent their entrance. What had been peaceful became chaotic. 
The district court ordered the integration to proceed; the national 
guard prevented it. The court then entered an injunction against 
any interference by Faubus and his troops. Accordingly, the na-
tional guard was withdrawn, but it was too late. The mob had been 
aroused. Only the arrival of federal troops permitted the Negro 
students to enter the high school. Little Rock had become an armed 
camp; law and order had disappeared. On petition of the school 
board, the district court granted permission to postpone the ef-
fectuation of the plan for two and one-half years. 67 The court of 
appeals, however, reversed the trial court's judgment,68 and the Su-
preme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 69 The 
Supreme Court recognized the problems of federalism that were 
involved in Brown, but it was steadfast in its adherence to its ear-
lier position.70 Its opinion was issued with the name of every Justice 
listed among its authors: 
The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed 
or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon 
the actions of the Governor and the Legislature. As this Court said 
65. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956). 
66. 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957). 
67. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958). 
68. 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958). 
69. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
70. 358 U.S. at 19-20. 
642 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:629 
some 41 years ago in a unanimous opm1on in a case involving 
another aspect of racial segregation: "It is urged that this proposed 
segregation will promote the public peace by preventing race con-
flicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation of the 
public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances 
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution." 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81. Thus law and order are not 
here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their consti-
tutional rights. The record before us clearly establishes that the 
growth of the Board's difficulties to a magnitude beyond its unaided 
power to control is the product of state action. Those difficulties, 
as counsel for the Board forthrightly conceded on oral argument in 
this Court, can also be brought under control by state action. 
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the 
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speak-
ing for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the 
fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the 
notable case of Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177, that "It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is." This decision declared the basic principle that 
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by 
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature 
of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown 
case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution 
makes it of binding effect on the States "anything in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Every state 
legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed 
by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to support this Constitu-
tion." Chief Justice Taney speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, 
said that this requirement reflected the framers' "anxiety to preserve 
[the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against 
resistance to or evasion of its authority on the part of a State .... " 
Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524. 
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against 
the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. 
Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: 
"If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the judg-
ments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights 
acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a 
solemn mockery ... ," United States v. Peters, 5 Crancl1 115, 136. 
A Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal court order is 
similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, 
in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, "it is manifest that the fiat of a 
state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would 
be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal 
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Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent 
phrases .... " Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-398.71 
The Court in this case was being carried away with its own 
sense of righteousness if, by the preceding paragraphs, it meant 
that a decision of the Supreme Court is supreme law in the same 
way that a legislative act of Congress is supreme law. The judgment 
in Brown was not binding on the state of Arkansas which was not 
a party to it. It was, however, binding precedent on any court be-
fore which the same question should arise. Such a court, whether 
it be federal or state, would be bound to choose the declaration of 
principle by the Supreme Court rather than the announced law of 
the state. Here Arkansas was a party to the litigation in the United 
States district court in Little Rock; and while it had the right to 
appeal the case in order to secure a reversal of position by the Su-
preme Court, it had no right to flout the order of the lower federal 
court. Thus, the "supreme law of the land" was not the Brown de-
cision, but the order of the trial court issued in the course of that 
court's duty to follow Brown. This, and this alone, is the meaning 
of Peters, of Ableman, and of Sterling-the cases the Court quoted 
and relied upon. 72 
The state of Louisiana took a different route than Arkansas, al-
though its goal was the same. Louisiana actually sought to invoke 
the ante bellum doctrine of interposition to avoid the Supreme 
Court's school desegregation efforts. The state legislature passed 
three statutes. The first provided for segregation of all public 
schools and the withholding of funds from any integrated school. 
The second authorized the governor to close all public schools if 
any one of them was integrated. The third provided for the take-
over by the governor of any school board which was under a deseg-
regation order. In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes, 
a three-judge district court held them invalid.73 Pending disposition 
of the case in the Supreme Court, the state sought a stay of the injunc-
tion. In denying the stay, the Court rendered a per curiam opinion 
giving short shrift to the ancient arguments.74 It exorcised quickly, 
if not finally, the ghosts of the Hartford Convention and the Ken-
71. ll58 U.S. at 16-19. 
72. See text accompanying note 71 supra. 
7ll. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960). 
74. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., ll64 U.S. 500 (1960). 
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tucky and Virginia Resolutions. Later the Supreme Court affirmed 
the district court's decision without opinion.75 
So far as the hard-core opposition to desegregation was con• 
cerned, however, the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court were 
of little avail. What Arkansas and Louisiana had failed to accom-
plish in the courts, Virginia tried to achieve. In Griffin v. County 
School Board of Prince Edward County,76 a case involving one of 
the school districts involved in the original Brown decision, the 
Court was called on to review the closing of the public schools in 
Prince Edward County, Virginia.77 In addition to closing the schools, 
the county provided financial assistance to students attending pri-
vate segregated schools. The Court held it unconstitutional for one 
county to close its public schools while all the other public schools 
in the state remained open. The Court was unanimous in rejecting 
the tactic as unconstitutional, but it was divided as to the appro• 
priate remedy. In an opinion by Justice Black, the Court said: 
the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Ed-
ward's public schools were closed and private schools operated in 
their place with state and county assistance, for one reason, and one 
reason only: to ensure, through measures taken by the county and the 
State, that white and colored children in Prince Edward County 
would not, under any circumstances, go to the same school. Whatever 
nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to 
abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, 
and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify 
as constitutional.78 
Justices Clark and Harlan disagreed "with the holding that the fed-
eral courts are empowered to order the reopening of the public 
schools in Prince Edward County."79 They apparently believed that 
the state retained the option under the equal protection clause 
either to open the Prince Edward County schools or to close all the 
rest, in order to assure equality of treatment. 
The Court in Griffin also indicated that its patience was at an 
end: "The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out, and that 
phrase can no longer justify denying these Prince Edward County 
school children their constitutional rights to an education equal to 
75. Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961). 
76. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
77. See also Louisiana Financial Assistance Commn. v. Poindexter, 389 U.S. 571 
(1968); St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962). 
78. 377 U.S. at 231. 
79. 377 U.S. at 234. 
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that afforded by the public schools in other parts of Virginia."80 
This attitude was confirmed when the Court refused to stay the 
Fifth Circuit's order to all the southern states within its domain 
to desegregate by the autumn of 1967.81 In the autumn of 1969, 
at the end of '\Varren's tenure, the order was still uneffected, but 
the Government was hopeful. 82 
The last of the Warren Court's major school desegregation cases 
were decided in 1968.83 At issue were the so-called "freedom of 
choice" and "freedom of transfer" programs, which allowed par-
ents to choose the school they wanted their children to attend or 
permitted them to transfer the children if the children were as-
signed to a school not of their choice. These programs were the 
last of the devious resorts of state legislatures to avoid desegrega-
tion. They certainly had not worked to accomplish desegregation.84 
In dealing with them, the Supreme Court equivocated. Justice 
Brennan, in Green v. County School Board,85 i;\Trote the opinion 
for a Court that was again unanimous. He suggested that the meas-
ure of the validity of a "free choice" system was the extent to which 
it eliminated a "dual system" of schools within the jurisdiction: 
It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed 
plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestab-
lishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the district 
court to weigh that claim in light of the facts at hand and in light 
of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more 
promising in their effectiveness. Where the court finds the board to 
be acting in good faith and the proposed plan to have real prospects 
80. 377 U.S. at 234. 
81. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 386 U.S. 1001 (1967). 
82. On August 25, 1969, The New York Times trumpeted: "U.S. OFFICIALS SEE 
PUPIL INTEGRATION DOUBUNG IN THE SOUTH." At 1, col. I. On August 26, 1969, in a 
less ebullient tone, the front page of The New York Times reported a break between 
the federal government and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund "because of the Nixon 
Administration's decision last week to throw its weight behind a slowdown in desegrega-
tion in Mississippi and, by implication, throughout the South." At 1, col. 7. But see 
note 83 infra. 
83. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 
391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Commrs., 391 U.S. 450 (1968). However, in 
October 1969, the Court, under the leadership of Warren Burger, handed down what 
'\Vest's Supreme Court Reporter emblazoned "The Immediate Desegregation Case,'' 
banning immediately dual school systems in Mississippi. Alexander v. Holmes County 
Bd. of Educ., 90 Sup. Ct. 29 (1969). Although the Nixon administration vowed to 
implement the Court's decision, the practical effect of the case was not salutary. See 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1970, at 1, col. 2. 
84. See U.S. CoMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, 
at 45-69 (1967). 
85. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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for dismantling the state-imposed dual system "at the earliest practi-
cal date," then the plan may be said to provide effective relief .... 
We do not hold that "freedom of choice" can have no place in 
such a plan. We do not hold that a "freedom-of-choice" plan might 
of itself be unconstitutional, although that argument has been urged 
upon us. Rather, all we decide today is that in desegregating a dual 
system a plan utilizing "freedom of choice" is not an end in itself.86 
Brennan went on to show in detail how the particular plan that 
was the subject of review in the Green case failed to meet the 
Court's standards: 
The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan cannot 
be accepted as a sufficient step to "effectuate a transition" to a 
unitary system. In three years of operation not a single white child 
has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro 
children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965 
and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still 
attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school 
system remains a dual system. . . . The Board must be required to 
formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear 
open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise 
realistically to convert promptly to a system without a "white" 
school and a "Negro" school, but just schools.87 
The Court then held, in Raney v. Board of Education88 and Monroe 
v. Board of Commissioners,89 that the respective "freedom of choice" 
and "freedom of transfer" plans under attack did not effectively 
change the "dual" systems into unitary systems and that those plans 
were therefore invalid. Moreover, it ordered the district courts to 
retain jurisdiction to ensure that desegregation took place imme-
diately. 90 
The Court's commitment to "disestablishmentarianism" has 
been, from the beginning, confined ·to the problems arising in 
states in which school segregation was compelled by law before the 
Brown decisions. It has said nothing about the so-called de facto 
segregation in nonsouthern communities. Yet this problem is under 
vigorous attack by way of legislation,91 and sooner or later the Court 
will have to pass on questions arising under that legislation and 
under its administration by the Department of Health, Education, 
86. 391 U.S. at 439-40. 
87. 391 U.S. at 441-42. 
88. 391 U.S. 443 (1968). 
89. 391 U.S. 450 (1968). 
90. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 339; Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 
at 449; see Monroe v. Board of Comrors., 391 U.S. at 460. 
91. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). , 
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and Welfare. 92 Meanwhile, the Court seemed inclined to leave the 
burden of implementing desegregation to the legislative and exec-
utive branches of the national government.93 
Although the Court has long been engaged in the transfer of 
power from the states to the national government, the school deseg-
regation cases marked the first time that it used the equal protec-
tion clause so fundamentally. Never before had the knife gone so 
deeply into the fabric of society as it did in those cases. Surgical 
excision of a cancer is a tricky thing. It is not clear that the prog-
nosis is favorable. 
Equality as a judicial mandate is certainly not readily accom-
plished. Indeed, the Court's own efforts have brought about little 
change. Prior to congressional action by the passage of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act,94 desegregation had been minimal. Since the Civil 
Rights Act, the change has been better but still not good. Clearly, 
the legislature with its power over the purse, has more effective 
instruments in its hands than does the Court for bringing about 
the change. On the other hand, Congress is far less committed to 
the metamorphosis than the Court has been. Whether any action at 
the national or state levels would have been forthcoming had not 
the Court taken the first step, no one will ever be able to say. Cer-
tainly Congress was not ready to act when the Court acted. The 
question also remains for some whether the desegregation rule was 
a better first step than an attempt at enforcement of the separate-
but-equal doctrine would have been. Most "right thinking" people 
believe that it was. But there are reasonable men, blacks as well 
as whites, who believe that the conditions of the Negro in America 
would have improved faster if concentration had been placed on 
the improvement of Negro education in the black schools, that 
such improved education would have soon resulted in integration 
not only in the schools but throughout American life. On the other 
hand, the advice that Learned Hand gave to the President of Har-
vard University in 1922 still sounds persuasive even in a different 
context: 
... I cannot agree that a limitation based upon race will in the end 
92. See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare, 
Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance with Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 33 Fed. Reg. 4955 (1968). 
93. See, e.g., Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 924 (1964). But see note 83 supra. 
94. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified in 5 U.S.C. 
H 2204·05 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6 
(1964). 
648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:629 
work out any good purpose. I£ the Jew does not mix well with the 
Christian, it is no answer to segregate him. Most of those qualities 
which the Christian dislikes in him are, I believe, the direct result 
of that very policy in the past. Both Christian and Jew are here; they 
must in some way learn to live on tolerable terms, and disabilities 
have never proved tolerable. It seems hardly necessary to argue that 
they intensify on both sides the very feelings which they are designed 
to relieve on one. If after acquaintance, the two races are irretrievably 
alien, which I believe unproven, we are, it is true, in a bad case, but 
even so not as bad as if we separate them on race lines. Along that 
path lie only bitterness and distraction.95 
The problems of segregation obviously extended far beyond 
the public schools. Although the rationale of the Brown case was 
limited to the field of education, the Court was soon faced with a 
series of problems not resoluble in terms of the arguments made in 
Brown.96 In most of these cases, including all of the early ones, the 
Court took the easy way out. It struck dmvn state-imposed segrega-
tion by means of per curiam orders which failed to explain how 
the carefully contained Brown opinion opened like an umbrella to 
bring these other matters under its shelter. Some friends of the 
Court complained about this evasion of responsibility.97 Others, 
more result-oriented, and pleased with the result, criticized the 
critics.98 
Whatever the propriety of the means, the Court made it clear 
through a series of unexplained decisions that the separate-but-equal 
notion was, indeed, dead. According to the Court, the state could 
not require segregation in public auditoriums,99 on public beaches,100 
on municipal golf courses,101 in state-sponsored athletic events,102 
in buses,103 or even in jails.104 The requirement of nonsegregated 
courtrooms was a fortiori.105 The failure to desegregate public 
95. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 21 (2d ed. I. Dilliard 1953). 
96. See cases cited in notes 99-106 infra. 
97. See, e.g., H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLmcs, AND FUNDAMENTAL I.Aw 30-31 (1961). 
98. See, e.g., E. Rosrow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 
in Tru; SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 3, 25-39 (1962). 
99. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Schiro v. Bynum, 
375 U.S. 395 (1964). 
100, Mayor &: City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
101. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); New Orleans Park Assn. v. 
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958). 
102. State Athletic Commn. v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959). 
103. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896). 
104. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). 
105. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963). 
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parks by 1963 finally evoked a full-dress opinion by a unanimous 
Court, but that opinion was directed solely to the issue of inordinate 
delay.106 By 1963, the Court could properly rely on the fact that 
everyone knew or should have known that the result reached in 
Brown-if not its reasoning-governed the right of access to pub-
licly owned and controlled facilities.107 
The Court, however, was quickly moved into a new and even 
more difficult series of problems. Like the bans in the Bill of Rights, 
which are directed to actions of the national government and not 
to those of its citizens, so the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment is directed, by its terms, to the actions of states 
themselves and not to those of their residents. This restriction 
created hard issues for the Court in its attempts to solve the racial 
problems of the country, because the essence of racial discrimina-
tion was social, not political. No laws were required to effectuate 
segregation; it would exist without them. Jim Crow was not the 
creature of state governments; state governments were the creatures 
of Jim Crow. Litigation that resulted in a ban solely on state ac-
tivity-even when the decrees were effective--could reach only the 
surface of the problem. The Court found itself compelled more 
and more to deal with the actions of individuals as though they 
were subject to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment. It 
made for the hardest kind of opinion writing, for it meant writing 
about one thing while acting on another. 
Just as the Warren Court's predecessor had given it a leg up in 
the school segregation area, so too, in the area of state action, ear-
lier Courts had started moving down the path in the direction that 
the Warren Court wanted to take. By the time of the Warren Court, 
it could be said that state action included not only activities car-
ried out by governmental officials pursuant to a legislative mandate, 
but actions of officials even in contravention of state law,108 actions 
of private citizens carrying out state functions,109 and at least some 
actions of state courts in enforcing private agreements.U0 Still, these 
cases, like those to be decided by the Warren Court, afforded no 
clear rationale for the concept of state action. 
In the 1956 term, the Court was faced with the question whether 
106. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). 
107. See 373 U.S. at 530 n.2. 
108. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
109. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 
501 (1946). 
110. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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a private school whose trustees were members of the Board of Di-
rectors of City Trusts, an official municipal agency, would be re-
quired to desegregate.111 The segregation had resulted not from any 
decision of the Board of Directors, but because of the terms of the 
trust establishing the school. The Court held that, even though no 
discretion was exercised by the state to exclude Negroes, the state 
could not properly be the means for effecting such discrimination. 
Later, however, when the school was removed from the control of 
the official agency by action of the probate court, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that desegregation was no longer required; 
and the Supreme Court refused to review that decision.112 
Then, in 1961, came Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity.113 A private restaurant in a municipally owned and operated 
parking facility, which was built on land condemned by the state 
and financed by tax-exempt bonds, refused service to a Negro. The 
Negro brought suit in the state courts seeking a declaratory judg-
ment of his right to service, but the Delaware supreme court re-
jected his claim on the ground that the restaurant was acting in 
a "purely private capacity."114 The Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed that decision and, in a rather murky opinion, held 
the discrimination unconstitutional. Without isolating the factors 
that transmuted the action of the restaurateur into state action, 
Justice Clark, for a divided Court, held that the whole situation 
amounted to state action: 
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not 
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but it has elected to 
place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted dis-
crimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position 
of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a 
joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, 
cannot be considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall 
without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, the 
conclusion drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record 
are by no means declared as universal truths on the basis of which 
every state leasing agreement is to be tested. Owing to the very 
"largeness" of government, a multitude of relationships might 
111. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). 
112. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). 
Ultimately the school was desegregated by a reinterpretation of the trust by the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F .2d 120 (3d 
Cir. 1968); cf. Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 387 U.S. 423 (1967). 
Ill!. 365 U.S. 715. 
114. 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960). 
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appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that it 
must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of 
the peculiar facts or circumstances present. Therefore respondents' 
prophecy of nigh universal application of a constitutional precept 
so peculiarly dependent for its invocation on appropriate facts fails 
to take into account "differences in circumstances [which] beget ap-
propriate differences in law," Whitney v. State Tax Gomm'n, 309 
U.S. 530, 542. Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we 
hold today is that when a State leases public property in the manner 
and for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the prescrip-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the 
lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants written 
into the agreement itself.115 
The Court's opinion in Burton is pregnant with possibilities for a 
broad expansion of the state action doctrine. But its concluding 
language made it unlikely that the case would spawn anything but 
further litigation. 
At the following term of the Court, however, a case was disposed 
of on the authority of Burton, although the only analogous factor 
was that the restaurant was leased from a municipal facility. In 
Turner v. Memphis,116 the appellant had not been refused service 
but had been offered segregated service. The result was, appro-
priately, the same. What was surprising was that the divided Bur-
ton Court had turned into a unanimous Court in disposing of the 
Turner case. This change could hardly be explained by the fact 
that the restaurant was located within a municipal facility, because 
that situation existed in both cases; but it might be explained by 
the fact that the restaurant in Turner was under compulsion to 
desegregate because of its airport location, a factor the Court did not 
mention. 
The increasingly active nature of the Negro Revolution brought 
the Court more difficult problems in a series of "sit-in cases" in 
the 1962 term. In those cases, Negroes who had "sat in" at lunch 
counters and restaurants that had refused to serve them and had 
ordered them to leave had been convicted of criminal trespass 
under state laws. Here the restaurants were not located in state 
buildings or on state property: But while the earlier cases had in-
volved relief sought by the persons discriminated against, in these 
cases it was the discriminating party who invoked the law that 
resulted in the criminal convictions. 
115. !165 U.S. at 725-26. 
ll6. !169 U.S. !150 (1962), 
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In Peterson v. City of Greenville,117 ten Negroes had refused 
to leave a lunch counter at an S. H. Kress store after service had 
been refused to them and the manager had ordered them to go. 
The manager called the police who arrested the Negroes for 
criminal trespass, and the Negroes were convicted. The manager 
said that he had ordered them to leave solely because they were 
Negroes; no other objection to their presence was offered. An 
ordinance of Greenville made it illegal to serve "white persons 
and colored persons in the same room [except] where separate 
facilities are furnished."118 The Supreme Court's opinion, written 
by Chief Justice Warren for all the members of the Court except 
Harlan, upset the convictions entirely on the basis of the uncon-
stitutionality of the ordinance. The Court conceded that the four-
teenth amendment did not inhibit private conduct, but it stated 
that the restaurant's action in this case could not be considered 
private conduct: 
It cannot be denied that here the City of Greenville, an agency of 
the State, has provided by its ordinance that the decision as to 
whether a restaurant facility is to be operated on a desegregated 
basis is to be reserved to it. When the State has commanded a partic-
ular result, it has saved to itself the power to determine that result 
and thereby "to a significant extent" has become "involved" in it, 
and, in fact, has removed the decision from the sphere of private 
choice. It has thus effectively determined that a person owning, 
managing or controlling an eating place is left with no choice of his 
own but must segregate his white and Negro patrons. The Kress 
management, in deciding to exclude Negroes, did precisely what 
the city law required.119 
The decision in Lombard v. Louisiana,120 decided the same day, 
was more difficult to reach. In that case, the defendants were con-
victed under the state "criminal mischief" statute for refusing to 
leave a lunch counter after being requested to do so. The Court, 
again speaking through Chief Justice Warren, managed to discover 
what it considered an equivalent of the ordinance in Peterson in 
proclamations issued by the mayor and chief of police to the effect 
that they would not condone sit-ins and would enforce the law 
against those who engaged in the practice: 
A State, or a city, may act as authoritatively through its executive 
117. 373 U.S. 244 (1963). 
118. Code of Greenville § 31-8 (1953), as amended (1958), quoted in 373 U.S. at 
246-47. 
119. 373 U.S. at 247-48. 
120. 373 U.S. 267 (1963). 
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as through its legislative body .... As we interpret the New Orleans 
city officials' statements, they here determined that the city would 
not permit Negroes to seek desegregated service in restaurants. 
Consequently, the city must be treated exactly as if it had an 
ordinance prohibiting such conduct.121 
Justice Douglas, who joined Warren's opinion, was prepared to 
expand the state action doctrine considerably further. He would 
have found that any use of the state's judiciary to enforce private 
discrimination-at least in a place of public accommodations-was 
a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, he would 
have ruled that 
[t]his restaurant is . . . an instrumentality of the State since the 
State charges it with duties to the public and supervises its per-
formance. The State's interest in and activity with regard to its 
restaurants extends far beyond any mere income-producing licensing 
requirement.122 
Justice Harlan's separate opinion set forth the basis for his 
concern and for his unwillingness to join the opinions offered by 
the majority of the Court: 
Underlying the cases involving an alleged denial of equal protection 
by ostensibly private action is a clash of competing constitutional 
claims of a high order: liberty and equality. Freedom of the indi-
vidual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and dispose 
of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, 
even unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large 
measure of protection from governmental interference. This liberty 
would be overridden, in the name of equality, if the strictures of 
the Amendment were applied to governmental and private action 
without distinction. Also inherent in the concept of state action are 
values of federalism, a recognition that there are areas of private 
rights upon which federal power should not lay a heavy hand and 
which should properly be left to the more precise instruments of 
local authority,123 
Harlan did not disagree, hardly anyone could, with the rationale of 
the Court in these cases, which was simply that state action encom-
passed action taken by individuals under the compulsion of state 
law. His concern came over the question whether there was such 
compulsion in the particular case. He agreed that there was in 
Peterson, but he felt that there was not in Lombard. 
121. 373 U.S. at 273. 
122. 373 U.S. at 282-83. 
123. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (concurring in Peterson, 
dissenting in Lombard). 
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The problem of a lack of the traditional type of state action 
appeared on the Court's doorstep again in the 1963 term. The 
issue, phrased as narrowly as possible, was "whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides the Negro with a self-executing federal right 
to equal treatment by the proprietors of private establishments 
catering to all the public except Negroes."124 Again the Court 
managed to evade the troublesome question, as it disposed of a 
series of cases on one ground or other that found state action else-
where than in the judicial enforcement of the trespass laws. In 
Robinson v. Florida,125 for example, the Court found that health 
regulations caused such burdens to desegregated restaurants that 
they, in effect, compelled the proprietors to exclude Negroes. In 
fact, however, the evidence in the case that the health regulations 
had anything to do with the segregation was no more than fanciful. 
In another case, the Court reversed the defendants' convictions on 
the equally ephemeral grounds that the defendants did not have 
adequate notice that they were breaking the law.126 In a third case, 
the Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to support the 
conviction, despite the state court's decisions to the contrary.127 In 
still another decision, the Court pinned the responsibility for the 
exclusion on the state because the amusement park employee who 
issued the eviction notice was a deputy sheriff.128 The opinions in 
these cases were not convincing of anything except the Court's 
patent desire to avoid deciding the troublesome question of the 
scope of state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. 
Any broadening of the state action concept to include the action of 
restaurant and amusement park proprietors would, as Harlan had 
suggested, have impinged on individual freedom of association. On 
the other hand, to permit the conviction of these peaceful demon-
strators to stand would have caused the Court's collective gorge 
to rise. 
The principal case on this issue during the 1963 term, Bell v. 
Maryland,129 looked like a four-square confrontation. But that 
anticipation underestimated the Court's capacity for evasion. In 
Bell, twelve Negro students had been convicted under the state's 
criminal trespass laws for engaging in a restaurant sit-in. They 
124. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 101. 
125. 378 U.S. 153 (1964-). 
126. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 34-7 (1964). 
127. Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964). 
128. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964). 
129. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
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unsuccessfully challenged their convictions on both due process and 
equal protection grounds through the courts of Maryland. Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, did not "reach the questions that 
have been argued under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."130 Avoidance of the ques-
tions was based on the fact that, subsequent to the time at which 
the convictions were affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
both a city ordinance and a state statute had been passed making it 
illegal to discriminate against Negroes in restaurants in the city and 
the state. It took some very fancy construction to read Maryland law 
as providing that a conviction which was affirmed by the highest 
state court was subject to attack on the ground that it was incon-
sistent with a subsequently enacted public-accommodations law. 
But the Supreme Court did not itself undertake to rewrite Maryland 
law. It sent the case back to the Maryland courts with a blueprint 
for doing so. 
Although the majority opinion in Bell was supported by six 
members of the Court-the Chief Justice, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, 
Stewart, and Goldberg-several Justices spoke out on the substantive 
constitutional issues in their own separate opinions. Douglas, as 
he had earlier, was prepared to go as far as was necessary to inhibit 
discrimination in places of public accommodation. He was eager 
to do so especially because this important issue was not being faced 
by the legislative branch: 
\Ve have in this case a question that is basic to our way of life and 
fundamental in our constitutional scheme. No question preoccupies 
the country more than this one; it is plainly justiciable; it presses 
for a decision one way or another; we should resolve it. The people 
should know that when filibusters occupy other forums, when op-
pressions are great, when the clash of authority between the indi-
vidual and the State is severe, they can still get justice in the courts. 
vVhen we default, as we do today, the prestige of law in the life of 
the Nation is weakened.1:i1 
The demands of justice were equally clear to Douglas. He would 
have utilized the equal protection clause to put "all restaurants ... 
on an equal £ooting"132 by making the state compel all of them 
to serve Negroes. What the state of Maryland did by legislative 
action, Douglas was prepared to have the Court do by constitutional 
compulsion. There is no conflict, he asserted, between the right 
130. 378 U.S. at 228. 
131. 378 U.S. at 244-45. 
!82. 378 U.S. at 246, 
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of the Negro to service and the personal preference of the restaurant 
owner not to serve him, because many, if not most, restaurants are 
owned by corporations: "Here, as in most of the sit-in cases before 
us, the refusal of service did not reflect 'personal prejudices' but 
business reasons. . . . The truth is, I think, that the corporate 
interest is in making money, not in protecting 'personal prej-
udices.' "133 But even if the choice were between the personal 
prejudices of the storekeeper and the right of the Negro to service, 
the answer in Douglas' view should be the same. As President 
Johnson said in his State of the Union Message on January 8, 
1964, "[s]urely [Negroes and whites] can work and eat and travel 
side by side in their own country."134 Such rights are, for Douglas, 
federally created rights of citizenship that must be enforced: "Sel-
dom have modern cases . . . so exalted property in suppression of 
individual rights.''136 "Apartheid"-a word Douglas reiterated-
is barred by the common law and must not "be given constitutional 
sanction in the restaurant field.''136 There was, for Douglas, no 
problem concerning the existence of state action. Convictions for 
trespass, he stated, clearly fall within the ban of Shelley v. Kraemer: 137 
"Why should we refuse to let state courts enforce apartheid in resi-
dential areas of our cities but let state courts enforce apartheid in 
restaurants? If a court decree is state action in one case, it is in the 
other. Property rights, so heavily underscored, are equally involved 
in each case."138 To reject this theory, the Justice suggested, is to 
enhance the power of corporate management to a greater degree 
than ever before: "Affirmance would make corporate management 
the arbiter of one of the deepest conflicts in our society ... .''130 
According to Douglas, most corporations are already suffering the 
results of absentee management. When "the corporation is little 
more than a veil for a man and wife or brother and brother . . . 
disregarding the corporate entity often is the instrument for achiev-
ing a just result. But the relegation of a Negro customer to second-
class citizenship is not just. Nor is fastening apartheid on America 
a worthy occasion for tearing aside the corporate veil.''140 
Justice Goldberg, always a joiner, joined Douglas' opinion as 
133. 378 U.S. at 246 (footnote omitted). 
134. Quoted in 378 U.S. at 247. 
135. 378 U.S. at 253. 
136. 378 U.S. at 254. 
137. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
138. 378 U.S. at 259. 
139. 378 U.S. at 264. 
140. 378 U.S. at 271. 
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well as Brennan's. But he also proceeded to write one of his own 
in which he was joined by Douglas and the Chief Justice. Goldberg 
found the answer to the problem as much in the aura of the Consti-
tution as in its words and its history. His novel argument was that 
the Civil Rights Cases141 should be read as sustaining the conclusion 
that he and Douglas offered, since in those cases Justice Bradley had 
premised the Court's position on the assumption that "[i]nnkeepers 
and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are 
aware, are bound to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper 
accommodations to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith 
apply for them."142 Goldberg obviously believed that, where this 
is untrue, as it is with regard to restaurants in most states, the 
Civil Rights Cases should be stood on their heads. In any event, he 
told us, John Marshall Harlan I, was right, and Bradley was ·wrong. 
There can be no recognized conflict, Goldberg continued, between 
the rights of Negroes to enjoy public accommodations and the rights 
of the owners to exclude Negroes. The owners have no such rights. 
In Goldberg's view, the Constitution commands that the state 
compel the owner to serve the Negro; it certainly cannot aid the 
owner in his refusal to do so by permitting him to invoke the state 
trespass laws. Indeed, Goldberg implied, if the owner resorts to 
self-help to remove the unwanted visitors from the premises, it is 
he and not the patron who should be subjected to the sanction of 
the laws. In the context of such a case, then, the constitutional right 
of privacy, which Goldberg was later to embrace with vigor,143 was 
nowhere to be found: 
[Certainly there are] rights pertaining to privacy and private as-
sociation ... themselves constitutionally protected liberties. 
We deal here, however, with a claim of equal access to public 
accommodations. This is not a claim which significantly impinges 
upon personal associational interests; nor is it a claim infringing 
upon the control of private property not dedicated to public use. A 
judicial ruling on this claim inevitably involves the liberties and 
freedoms both of the restaurant proprietor and of the Negro citizen . 
. . . The history and purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate, 
however, that the Amendment resolves this apparent conflict of 
liberties in favor of the Negro's right to equal public accommoda-
tions. . .. The broad acceptance of the public in this and, in other 
restaurants clearly demonstrated that the proprietor's interest in 
private or unrestricted association is slight.144 
141. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
142. 109 U.S. at 25. 
143. See Goldberg's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), 
in which privacy becomes a ninth amendment right. 
144. 378 U.S. at 313-14. 
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It came as a surprise to many that it was Justice Black who 
picked up the gauntlet thrown down by Douglas, Goldberg, and 
Warren. Black was joined by Harlan and White. For the senior 
Justice there was no state action in Bell. Shelley v. Kraemer, Black 
felt, was inapposite, for in that case, the Court properly held that 
state enforcement of the covenants had the effect of denying to the 
parties their federally guaranteed right to own, occupy, enjoy, and 
use their property without regard to race or color. . . . ·when an 
owner of property is willing to sell and a would•be purchaser is 
willing to buy, then the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ... prohibits a 
State, whether through its legislature, executive, or judiciary, from 
preventing the sale on the grounds of the race or color of one of 
the parties.145 
Obviously the same situation was not present in Bell. Black's inter-
pretation of Shelley was interesting, but was certainly not the 
classic or even a persuasive one. Yet neither was the construction 
given by Douglas to the same case a convincing one. The Court, 
Justice Black went on, is not Congress; each has its own role to play: 
This Court has done much in carrying out its solemn duty to 
protect people from unlawful discrimination. And it will, of course, 
continue to ~arry out this duty in the future as it has in the past. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment of itself does not compel either a 
black man or a white man running his own private business to 
trade with anyone else against his will .... The case before us does 
not involve the power of the Congress to pass a law compelling 
privately owned businesses to refrain from discrimination on the 
basis of race and to trade with all if they trade with any. We express 
no views as to the power of Congress, acting under one or another 
provision of the Constitution, to prevent racial discrimination in the 
operation of privately owned businesses, nor upon any particular 
form of legislation to that end.146 
Thus, the judicial phase of the right to equal treatment in 
places of public accommodation came to an end, with a majority 
of the Court never deciding the question on the merits. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964147 became law and, for a while, took the spotlight. 
The Civil Rights Act did not solve the problem of state action. 
It only amended it a bit. Since the Court could work only with the 
fourteenth amendment, the question which the Court faced was 
whether it could impose a rule of nondiscrimination on individuals 
145. 378 U.S. at 330-31. 
146. 378 U.S. at 342-43. 
147. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, codified in 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 2204-05 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6 
(1964). 
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solely because of the language and purpose of section I of that 
amendment. With the new statute, however, the question became 
whether Congress could impose such a rule of nondiscrimination. 
Two major differences were clear. Congress was not limited to the 
fourteenth amendment in seeking to eliminate discrimination; and 
congressional authorization under the fourteenth amendment came 
by way of section 5 as well as by reason of section I. Whether section 
5 authorized action that section I did not was a question that had 
not yet been answered by the Warren Court.148 
It was with inordinate haste that the Civil Rights Act was 
tested in the Supreme Court. Seldom is a statute authoritatively 
validated by the Court in the same year that it is enacted into law. 
But that was the case with the Civil Rights Act. Section 20l(a) of 
the law provides: 
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of 
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommoda-
tions of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, 
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, 
religion, or national origin.149 
The test cases involved a restaurant and a motel. Restaurants and 
motels were declared by the statute to be public accommodations 
within the meaning of the statute if their operations "affect com-
merce" or if they are supported by "State action."150 Motels affect 
commerce by definition. Restaurants affect commerce if they serve 
or offer to serve food to interstate travelers or if "a substantial pro-
portion of the food served" has "moved in interstate commerce. "151 
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Incorporated v. United States,152 the 
Court upheld the validity of the statute as applied to a motel because 
of the "overwhelming evidence" presented to Congress that racial 
discrimination in motels had an adverse effect on interstate com-
merce.153 Some may find the evidence less than ovenvhelming, 
manufactured in some measure by federal executive officials at the 
command of their superiors. But it does not take ovenvhelming 
evidence to justify congressional findings of fact. Thus, the Court 
rested on the commerce clause rather than on the fourteenth 
148. See Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 81. 
149. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964). 
150. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 20l(b), 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a(b) (1964). 
151. Act of July 2, 1964-, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 20l(c), 78 Stat. 24-3, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a(c) (1964-). 
152. 379 U.S. 241 (1964-). 
153. 379 U.S. at 253. 
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amendment to justify the federal rule of nondiscrimination in 
places of public accommodation. 
Katzenbach v. McClung154 involved a restaurant-Ollie's Bar-
becue. Again the evidence was far from "overwhelming" that "a 
substantial portion of food s~rved" at Ollie's Barbecue came from 
interstate commerce, or that, if it did, the portion was of such mag-
nitude as to affect interstate commerce. But the Court dispensed 
with this necessity by invoking the principles of Wickard v. Fil-
burn.155 Ollie's interstate purchases might be insignificant, but all 
barbecue stands together consume enough food through interstate 
commerce as to have a serious effect. Again there were findings of 
fact by Congress, dubious but desirable, that restaurants which 
discriminate sell less food than would nondiscriminatory restaurants, 
because interstate travel by Negroes was inhibited by discrim-
inatory action which cut off part of the potential market. Since 
people tend to eat wherever they happen to be, however, it is not 
quite clear how interstate commerce would be enhanced by this 
compelled nondiscrimination. To the extent that they ate at Ollie's, 
they would be forsaking some other seller of the same kind of goods. 
But there is no arguing by the Court with Congress when Congress 
has reached conclusions that the Court admires. Indeed, the Court 
itself readily acknowledged that the objective of the statute was not 
really the enhancement of interstate commerce: 
In framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with what 
it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from 
the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial dis-
crimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden 
which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, 
given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not 
restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate 
commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and 
social wrong.156 
In any event, congressional motive is not a proper subject for 
judicial scrutiny.157 
The reach of the commerce clause was not extended by these 
cases. The Supreme Court a score of years earlier had equated 
Congress' reach with its grasp.158 Nor were there any strong judicial 
154. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
155. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
156. 379 U.S. at 257. 
157. See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Gau, 
1968 Sup. Cr. REv. I. 
158. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, !!17 
U.S. 111 (1942); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946). 
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precedents in the way of the Court's conclusion. The Civil Rights 
Cases159 declaring unconstitutional the 1875 statute attempting to 
impose integration on places of public accommodation had rested 
exclusively on a lack of power under the fourteenth amendment. 
Congress had not sought at that time to rest on the commerce 
clause, which had not yet taken on its expansive new meaning, nor 
had the Court examined the authority that might come from that 
clause. 
The opinions in McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel were not 
persuasive for the same reason that the earlier cases in the series 
were not persuasive. The result was good, but the Court ·was not 
facing the real issues, as the authors of the separate opinions made 
clear. Justice Douglas "would prefer to rest on the assertion of 
legislative power contained in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
.... " He believed that 
[a] decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment would have a 
more settling effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a 
particular restaurant or inn is within the commerce definitions of 
the Act or whether a particular customer is an interstate traveler. 
Under my construction, the Act would apply to all customers in all 
the enumerated places of public accommodation. And that construc-
tion would put an end to all obstructionist strategies and finally 
close one door on a bitter chapter in American history.160 
It is doubtful, however, that reliance on the fourteenth amend-
ment would have been more effective than reliance on the com-
merce clause. The requirements for inclusion in the commerce 
clause were so easily met as to be mere paper demands, What 
Douglas was anxious to do was to reassert the proposition that any 
judicial enforcement of discriminatory acts qualified for state action 
under the rule in Shelley v. Kraemer. His position had not changed 
since his opinion in Bell v. Maryland. Justice Goldberg, too, wrote 
a separate opinion reasserting his notions of state action as he had 
stated them in Bell v. Maryland. There were no dissenting opinions 
or votes in either McClung or Heart of Atlanta Motel. Thus, the 
congressional power was unanimously sustained, but there was still 
no rationale for the state action concept. And the rationale re-
mained important, for the statute by no means sought to put an 
end to all discrimination based on race or color. 
The Court was still not off the hook. There was a plethora of 
cases of convictions under state trespass statutes that had been decided 
159. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
160. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (con-
curring opinion). 
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prior to the enactment of the 1964 Act. Some of them were on their 
way to the Supreme Court-indeed, some had arrived-before the 
legislation was enacted. If the Court were compelled to decide these 
cases without resort to the Civil Rights Act, it might have to answer 
the thorny problem that it had so long evaded. 
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill161 raised just those issues. The Civil 
Rights Act provides in section 203(c), that "[n]o person shall ... 
punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right 
or privilege secured by section 201 .... "162 Clearly, convictions 
resulting from acts committed after the passage of the statute would 
not be sustained. But what about the cases resulting in judgments 
prior to the passage of the Act? Justice Clark, ·writing for the 
majority, asserted that if these cases had arisen in the federal courts 
prior to the passage of the statute, they would, under common-law 
doctrine, abate by reason of the statute. He then concluded that 
cases arising in state courts should be decided no differently. His 
strongest argument for this conclusion was that it avoided the need 
to decide a constitutional question. Justice Black dissented: 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, validly, I think, made it unlawful 
for certain restaurants thereafter to refuse to serve food to colored 
people because of their color. The Court now interprets the Act as a 
command making it unlawful for the States to prosecute and convict 
"sit-in" demonstrators who had violated valid state trespass laws 
prior to passage of the federal Act. The idea that Congress has the 
power to accomplish such a result has no precedent, so far as I know, 
in the nearly 200 years that Congress has been in existence . 
. . . The judge-made "common law rule" of construction on which 
the Court relies has been applied heretofore only where there was a 
repeal of one statute by another-not, as my Brother Harlan points 
out, where as here a later law passed by Congress places certain 
restrictions on the operation of the still valid law of a State. But 
even if the old common-law rule of construction taken alone would 
otherwise have abated these convictions, Congress nearly a century 
ago passed a "saving" statute ... to keep courts from imputing to it 
an intent to abate cases retroactively, unless such an intent was 
expressly stated in the law it passed.103 
There was, he stated, nothing in the legislative history to impute to 
Congress an intention to abate these convictions. Justices Harlan, 
Stewart, and White wrote opinions in agreement with Black's con-
161. 379 U.S. 306 (1964). 
162. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 203(c), 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 
(1964). 
163. 379 U.S. at 318-19. 
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clusions. Thus, by a single vote, the definition of state action was 
once again evaded. 
In the 1965 term, the Court began a revival and a reinvigoration 
of Reconstruction era laws. If it could not find the tools to protect 
and secure Negro equality in the fourteenth amendment itself, the 
Court would find them in the exercise of legislative power by Con-
gress. If it could not find them in new congressional legislation, 
it would find them in old legislation. So far as the reduction of state 
authority and the enhancement of national power were concerned, 
it made no difference which branch of the national government 
was the instrument of change. But reliance by the Court on con-
gressional authority left with the legislature the penultimate au-
thority to change the legislation on which the Court was relying. 
That authority, of course, was subject to the Court's ultimate power 
of statutory interpretation and judicial review.164 
Two cases that were before the Court in 1965 arose out of the 
attempted application of Reconstruction era laws to two lynchings 
in the South-one involving the lynching of three white civil rights 
workers in Mississippi, the other the lynching of a Negro civil rights 
leader in Georgia. Both cases came to the Court by direct appeal 
under the Criminal Appeals Act, with the consequence that the 
Court was free to speculate about the facts and was not confined 
to the proof on the record. The relevant statutory provisions are 
found in sections 241 and 242 of title 18, which read as follows: 
I£ two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or 
intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right 
or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or 
I£ two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the 
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise 
or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than S5,000 or imprisoned not more 
than ten years or both.165 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or custom, 
wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or Dis-
trict to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, 
or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such 
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are 
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more 
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.188 
164. See Burt, supra note 148. 
165. 18 u.s.c. § 241 (1964). 
166. 18 u.s.c. § 242 (1964). 
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These sections are a potpourri of the post-Civil War acts now cod-
ified in title 18. 
United States v. Price161 was concerned with the constitutional 
validity of an indictment under section 242 of three police officials 
and fifteen private citizens for conspiring to interfere with and in-
terfering with the rights of the deceased to due process of law by 
murdering them. The trial court had dismissed the section 242 
count of the indictment as to the individual defendants on the 
ground that they were not acting under color of law. The Supreme 
Court reversed this judgment in an opinion by Justice Fortas, speak-
ing for a unanimous Court: 
In the present case, according to the indictment, the brutal joint 
adventure was made possible by state detention and calculated 
release of the prisoners by an officer of the State. This action, clearly 
attributable to the State, was part of the monstrous design described 
by the indictment. State officers participated in every phase of the 
alleged venture: the release from jail, the interception, assault and 
murder. It was a joint activity from start to finish. Those who took 
advantage of participation by state officers in accomplishment of the 
foul purpose alleged must suffer the consequences of that participa-
tion. In effect, if the allegations are true, they were participants in 
official lawlessness, acting in willful concert with state officers and 
hence under color of law.168 
The trial court had also dismissed the section 241 counts as to all 
parties on the ground that "due process of law" is not a "right or 
privilege secured to [an individual] by the Constitution." Once 
again, the Court reversed, but this time it had to overcome the bar-
rier of an earlier opinion which it dealt with in a forthright manner: 
The argument, however, of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in 
Williams I [United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951)], upon 
which the District Court rests its decision, cuts beneath this. It does 
not deny that the accused conduct is within the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment, but it contends that in enacting § 241, the 
Congress intended to include only the rights and privileges con-
ferred on the citizen by reason of the "substantive" powers of the 
Federal Government-that is, by reason of federal power operating 
directly upon the citizen and not merely by means of prohibitions of 
state action .... We do not agree. 
The language of§ 241 is plain and unlimited .... [I]ts language 
embraces all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all 
of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United States. There 
is no indication in the language that the sweep of the section is con-
fined to rights that are conferred or "fl.ow from" the Federal Govern-
167. 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 
168. 383 U.S. at 795. 
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ment, as distinguished from those secured or confirmed or guaranteed 
by the Constitution.160 
Despite the plain meaning of the words, this case marked the first 
time that section 241 had been so broadly construed. But the Court, 
while expanding its own jurisdiction, was essentially placing a tool 
within the hands of the federal executive. For prosecutorial discre-
tion, which had made a dead letter of these sections for so many 
years, would still be determinative of the use to which they would 
be put. The Court, moreover, was fully conversant with the prob-
lem of federalism inherent in the case. It denied new incursions on 
the state domain but nevertheless justified them: 
The present application of the statutes at issue does not raise 
fundamental questions of federal-state relationships. We are here 
concerned ·with allegations which squarely and indisputably involve 
state action in direct violation of the mandate of the Fourteenth 
Amendment-that no State shall deprive any person of life or liberty 
without due process of law. This is a direct, traditional concern of 
the Federal Government. It is an area in which the federal interest 
has existed for at least a century, and in which federal participation 
has intensified as part of a renewed emphasis upon civil rights .... In 
any event, the problem, being statutory and not constitutional, is 
ultimately, as it was in the beginning, susceptible of congressional 
disposition.170 
United States v. Guest171 was a more controversial case. Never-
theless, it established, even if by indirection, the expansive powers 
of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to affect 
individual action which is unrelated to the state action required by 
section I. In Guest, the victim had been murdered while traveling 
benv-een states, and the defendants were charged with conspiracy 
to effect the killing in violation of section 241. One of those viola-
tions was the deprivation of the victim's rights to equal protection 
of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The Court, 
speaking through Justice Stewart, ruled that the rights protected by 
the equal protection clause, no less than those secured by the due 
process clause, were encompassed by the statute. The difficulty with 
the case, however, was that there were no state officials implicated 
in the conspiracy. The problem, then, was to find state action suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, for 
the Court asserted that state action was necessary if there was to be 
any violation of the equal protection clause: 
169. 383 U.S. at 800-01. 
170. 283 U.S. at 806-07. 
171. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
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It is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause itself arise only when there has been involvement of the State 
or of one acting under the color of its authority. The Equal Protec-
tion Clause "does not ... add any thing to the rights which one 
citizen has under the Constitution against another." . . . As MR. 
JusncE DOUGLAS more recently put it, "The Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done 
by individuals." ... This has been the view of the Court from the 
beginning .... It remains the Court's view today.172 
But the Court was capable of finding the necessary element of state 
action even here: 
This case, however, requires no determination of the threshold 
level that state action must attain in order to create rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause. This is so because, contrary to the argument 
of the litigants, the indictment in fact contains an express allegation 
of state involvement sufficient at least to require the denial of a 
motion to dismiss. One of the means of accomplishing the object of 
the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was "By causing the 
arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had 
committed criminal acts." ... The allegation of the extent of official 
involvement in the present case is not clear. It may charge no more 
than co-operative private and state action similar to that involved 
in Bell, but it may go considerably further. For example, the allega-
tion is broad enough to cover a charge of active connivance by agents 
of the State in the making of the "false reports," or other conduct 
amounting to official discrimination clearly sufficient to constitute 
denial of rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Although 
it is possible that a bill of particulars, or the proof if the case goes to 
trial, would disclose no co-operative action of that kind by officials of 
the State, the allegation is enough to prevent dismissal of this branch 
of the indictment.173 
Another count of the indictment accused the defendants of in-
terfering with the deceased's "right to travel." The trial court's 
dismissal of this count was also upset. The right to travel, said the 
Court, is a federally created right, derivable from some unsuspected 
place in the Constitution.174 According to the Court, the only lim-
itation on the invocation of section 241 as a means for punishing 
individual action in restraint of federal rights is a requirement that 
there must be proof of "specific intent to interfere with the federal 
right."175 Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, was the 
only member of the Court who objected to the creation of the right 
172. 383 U.S. at 755. 
173. 383 U.S. at 756-57. 
174. 383 U.S. at 757, 759. 
175. 383 U.S. at 760. 
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to travel as a federally created right separate and apart from the 
freedom from state interference with interstate commerce. He re-
minded the Court that it was a criminal statute that it was constru-
ing: 
Although the Court has ostensibly only "discovered" this private 
right in the Constitution and then applied § 241 mechanically to 
punish those who conspire to threaten it, it should be recognized 
that what the Court has in effect done is to use this all-encompassing 
criminal statute to fashion federal common-law· crimes, forbidden to 
the federal judiciary since the 1812 decision in United States v. Hud-
son, 7 Cranch 32. My Brother Douglas, dissenting in United States 
v. Classic [313 U.S. 299 (1941)], noted well the dangers of the in-
discriminate application of § 241: "It is not enough for us to 
find in the vague penumbra of a statute some offense about which 
Congress could have legislated, and then to particularize it as a 
crime because it is highly offensive." 313 U.S. at 331-32. 
I do not gainsay that the immunities and commerce provisions of 
the Constitution leave the way open for the finding of this "private" 
constitutional right, since they do not speak solely in terms of govern-
mental action. Nevertheless, I think it wrong to sustain a criminal 
indictment on such an uncertain ground. To do so subjects§ 241 to 
serious challenge on the score of vagueness and serves in effect to 
place this Court in the position of making criminal law under the 
name of constitutional interpretation. It is difficult to subdue mis-
givings about the potentialities of this decision.176 
The Warren Court, in particular, had been most stringent in 
imposing on the state legislatures and on Congress a duty to cross 
their t's and dot their i's in their statutes lest they find those statutes 
struck down for vagueness.177 That the members of the Court were 
prepared to sustain a statute by construing it as broadly as they 
did this one in Guest underscores the absence of an objective test 
for vagueness.178 
The Guest case was important as establishing a power in the 
federal courts, in addition to that in the national legislature, to 
make federal crimes out of what had been, for the most part, in-
fringements of state law. But it was also important because six 
176. 383 U.S. at 773-74. 
177. Cf., e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 289 U.S. 54 (1967) (loyalty oath); Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (loyalty oath); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 
(1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (loyalty oath); Cramp v. Board of 
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (loyalty oath); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) 
(freedom of association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (freedom of association); 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 536 (1965) (civil rights demonstration); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 
(1963) (civil rights demonstration). 
178. A keen analysis of the partisan use of the void-for-vagueness doctrine may be 
found in Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L 
R.Ev. 67, 75-85, 98-115 (1960). 
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members of the Court, in concurring opinions, established the 
scope of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment as reaching beyond 
the limitation of state action. Justice Clark, speaking also for 
Justices Black and Fortas, said: "[I]t is, I believe, both appropriate 
and necessary under the circumstances here to say that there now 
can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the 
Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without 
state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."170 
The left wing of the Court-Brennan, Warren, and Douglas-
reiterated the proposition that section 5 authorizes Congress to act 
without the restraints of the state action requirement. They had no 
need to conjure up the existence of state action in this case, as 
Stewart did. For them, section 5 is to the fourteenth amendment 
what the necessary and proper clause is to article I. 
Thus was the license issued to Congress. Whether Congress 
needed the authority is another question. With the power over com-
merce and the power over the purse, it had tools at its command 
that did not have the Achilles heel of requiring a jury from the 
vicinage to find defendants guilty. 
Guest, however, was not the Warren Court's last word on the 
subject of state action. That bete noire raised its ugly head again in 
the Court's 1966 term. Reitman v. Jl.1ulkey180 further confounded 
the confusion. California had adopted by referendum a constitu-
tional provision that, in effect, banned all open-housing legislation, 
state and local, within that state.181 The California legislature had 
itself passed two open-housing statutes that were purportedly in-
validated by the constitutional change. Suit was brought in the 
state courts challenging the validity of the adoption of Proposition 
14-the constitutional amendment-as violative of the fourteenth 
amendment. The Supreme Court of California held that Proposi-
tion 14 did violate the fourteenth amendment, but the court did 
not really say why.182 The United States Supreme Court affirmed 
that judgment in Reitman v. Mulkey, but it too did not really say 
why. As has been stated by two staunch supporters of the Supreme 
Court and the conclusion that it reached, 
the Court in Reitman v. Mulkey settled for an opinion that utterly 
failed to justify its decision. The principal alternatives available to 
the Court-assuming a decision to affirm the California court-were 
to affirm without opinion, to tackle the issue of substantive equal 
179. 383 U.S. at 762. 
180. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
181. CALIF. CoNsr. art. I, § 26. 
182. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P .2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966). 
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protection head on, or to temporize, avoiding the unavoidable by 
fudging. It is not shocking that the Court chose the last path.183 
By "substantive equal protection," the ·writers obviously meant an 
imposition of the Court's values under the label of equal protection 
-a process similar to that in which an earlier Court had engaged 
under the title of substantive due process. It is a dangerous game, 
but there are few who deny the Court's engagement in it. Neverthe-
less, the search for a rationale must continue, either in order to 
afford guidance for future decision or in order to save the Court 
from self-destruction. The only articulated reasoning in support of 
Reitman that sounds at all persuasive was provided by Professor 
Charles Black, whose personal inclinations are to eliminate the 
whole state action concept as an unnecessary barrier to the eradica-
tion of racial discrimination. He offered an explanation which is 
consistent with the precedents and which is far more convincing 
than anything that the high courts of California or the United 
States could produce: 
The decision in Reitman v. 1\,Iulkey is apt to be widely misunder-
stood, because both those who like it, and those who do not, are 
powerfully impelled to see it as holding more than it did-the former 
because a broad reading could open the way to attack on many more 
difficult situations in the field of housing and elsewhere, and the 
latter because a broad holding is easier, in the present state of pro-
fessional thought, to assail and discredit. The broader holding would 
have rested on the ground that the repeal of the fair housing law was 
itself the state action which denied equal protection. Further, since 
the distinction between states which up to now have, and those which 
up to now have not, enacted fair housing laws would seem to be unac-
ceptable as a criterion of state obligation, it ought to follow that all 
states have a duty to enact fair housing laws, and that if they do not 
the discrimination thus made possible is to be seen as sanctioned by 
their omission, and hence as infected with a forbidden state complic-
ity that calls down the ban of the fourteenth amendment. State 
"neutrality," the holders of this view would insist, is not possible 
-or, if possible, is not a sufficient fulfillment of the "equal protec-
tion" obligation .... 
The rule which I would propose, then, as a basis for the Reitman 
decision, is that where a racial group is in a political duel with those 
who would explicitly discriminate against it as a racial group, and 
where the regulatory action the racial group wants is of full and 
undoubted federal constitutionality, the state may not place in the 
way of the racial minority's attaining its political goal any barriers 
which, within the state's political system taken as a whole, are 
especially difficult of surmounting, by comparison with those barriers 
183. Karst &: Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal 
Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 39, 76. 
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that normally stand in the way of those who wish to use political 
processes to get what they want.1B4 
According to Professor Black, then, a state requirement that a 
majority of all the state's voters must approve any state or local 
open-housing legislation constitutes the state action that deprives 
the Negro of equal protection of the laws. Most other pressure 
groups do not have to meet that additional requirement on the 
state level, much less on the local level. Indeed, Proposition 14 does 
smack of changing the rules in the middle of the game, which no 
one would regard as affording equal protection. Let none be be-
mused, however, by the notion that Professor Black's suggestions 
would afford a precedent of narrow limits. Its consequences, if not 
so great as placing an affirmative burden on the state to provide 
open housing, would be felt in the destruction of many state consti-
tutional provisions now on the books, for, as Professor Black noted 
in the first paragraph quoted above, to draw a line between provi-
sions enacted now to establish barriers to political efforts by Negroes 
to secure their rights and those enacted some time ago would be 
difficult to justify. 
The capstone of the Supreme Court's shaky edifice was Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Company,185 which may have the effect of the last 
straw on the camel's back. It did not provide the long-sought ra-
tionale for state action, but it may have made that rationale ir-
relevant. The plaintiffs, a Negro man and his white wife, sought 
an injunction and damages against the defendant for its refusal to 
sell them a house solely on the ground of the would-be buyers' 
color. The Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to the relief 
sought, pursuant to a long dormant 1866 statute. It held further 
that the statute itself was a proper exercise of congressional power 
under the thirteenth amendment which, of course, is not entailed 
with a state action clause. The potentialities of the combination of 
holdings are great. 
The 1866 statute, as set out in the United States Code, provides: 
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by w~ite citizens thereof, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal 
property.1ss 
184. Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 
HARV. L. REv. 69, 73, 82 (1964). How far better Professor Black's approach is than that 
taken by the Court in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (amendment to city 
charter which rendered a fair-housing ordinance ineffective held denial of equal 
protection). 
185. 382 U.S. 409 (1968). 
186. 42 u.s.c. § 1982 (1964). 
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Given the historical background of the 1866 legislation, one might 
readily conclude that the statute removed the legal disabilities that 
had theretofore been imposed on Negroes in all parts of the country, 
but especially in the South. Instead of doing so, however, the Court 
derived from the statute an obligation on the part of an individual 
seller not to discriminate against potential purchasers by reason 
of their race. The means for achieving this worthy goal were dubi-
ous logic and abominable history, all carefully documented by 
Professor Casper.187 
Perhaps the important thing with respect to the Jones case, 
however, is not the poor credentials that the opinion carries, but 
its potential utilization which would make unnecessary much of the 
recent civil rights legislation or any further congressional action 
in this sphere. Still, in terms of additional remedies, the contem-
porary legislation could prove important, for it calls into play the 
forces of the national government to vindicate the rights granted, 
whereas the 1866 statute depends on self-help by the injured party. 
On the other hand, the new legislation has a narrower scope than 
has the broadly drawn Reconstruction model as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court. Professor Henkin has explained the Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Company potential this way: 
Indeed, does not the Court's reading render superfluous the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964? Title II of that Act provides that certain places 
of public accommodation may not discriminate on the basis of race 
in selling goods and services; the Court's construction of section 1982, 
when applied to personal property, renders the title (and its limita-
tions) superfluous. Moreover, by the Court's technique of construc-
tion, the right "to make and enforce contracts" guaranteed by the 
1866 Act should prevent a restaurant or hotel management from re-
fusing on the grounds of race to "make a contract" for service with a 
Negro. Indeed, that construction should prevent any employer from 
refusing "to make a contract" of employment with a Negro; and the 
fair employment provisions of the 1964 Act likewise become super-
fluous, as does the entire struggle, since the days of the New Deal, 
to enact fair employment legislation. 
One should also mention the Fair Housing title of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968. The majority of the Court rightly says that it 
is broader in coverage and in remedy than the 1866 statute as now 
interpreted. [This clearly overlooks the exemptions contained in the 
1968 Act that are not to be found in the 1866 statute.] But Congress 
had made a substantial contribution towards open housing, and one 
may properly ask why the Court could not resist the temptation to 
find in the earlier act what, by a fair reading, no Congress ever put 
there. 
187. Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SUP. Cr. 
R.Ev. 89. 
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The Court failed to distinguish between what meaning words will 
carry and what they will not, between interpretation and perversion, 
between the judicial function and that of Congress. And for the 
majority to assert that it is " 'not at liberty to seek ingenious analyti-
cal instruments' ... to carve from § 1982 an exception for private 
conduct" is surely disingenuous, and borders on chutzpah.188 
The result of this long series of Supreme Court decisions is 
that Congress is empowered, under the commerce clause, the thir-
teenth amendment, the fourteenth amendment, and, as will be 
seen, 189 the fifteenth amendment, to legislate against either public 
or private discrimination. That this result is desirable ought not be 
doubted. That it is legitimate is not so easily established. More im-
portant, however, is the weaponry that the Court has placed at its 
own disposal. Besides the clear mandates of the recent civil rights 
legislation, there are the even broader authorizations to be garnered 
from the revivified Reconstruction legislation. That earlier legisla-
tion includes not only the 1866 statute relied on in Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Company, not only the criminal sanctions justified in 
Guest and Price; but also, presumably, the Civil Rights Act of 
1875,190 erroneously invalidated in the Civil Rights Cases;191 the 
1870 statute,192 erroneously invalidated in United States v. Reese,193 
Hodges v. United States,194 and James v. Bowman;195 and the 1871 
statute,196 erroneously invalidated in United States v. Harris.197 
The cases which I have detailed at some length represent, to my 
mind, the very heart of the Warren Court's effort. It is on these 
cases that its claim on history will ultimately depend. Even before 
most of them were decided-indeed, just two years after Brown-
Justice Douglas coolly announced their success in one of his ex-
tracurricular efforts. In 1956, he wrote of American Negroes: 
[T]heir right to equality of treatment has at last been realized. 
No minority in any country has progressed so far in the same length 
of time as the American Negro. Today he sits in our legislatures, 
on our school boards, on many of the administrative agencies, and 
188. Henkin, On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 85-86 (1968). 
189. See text accompanying notes 242-43 infra. 
190. Act of March I, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 336. 
191. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
192. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 3-4, 19, 16 Stat. 140-41, 144. 
193. 92 U.S. 214 (1876). 
194. 203 U.S. I (1906). 
195. 190 U.S. 127 (1903). 
196. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. 
197. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
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on our courts. He is present in every profession and calling; he is 
an honored member of the American community.19s 
If medals were awarded for optimism, the good Justice earned his 
at that time. 
It is true that once segregation has been found to be violative 
of the equal protection clause, the cases in which a state or local 
government openly distinguished among its residents on the basis 
of race presented little difficulty for decision. Invidious discrimina-
tion by governments created problems only in ascertaining the facts. 
Any of these cases could have been settled by adoption of the first 
Justice Harlan's famous but simple credo: "Our Constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among cit-
izens:•rno It is of the essence of the equal protection clause that cer-
tain classifications made by governments are invalid, and it would 
have indeed been simple to establish the rule that any classification 
based on race or color is invalid. But the Warren Court never ac-
cepted that proposition. In McLaughlin v. Florida,200 for example, 
Justice White, in striking down a criminal anticohabitation statute 
that imposed higher penalties on Negro or mixed couples than on 
all-white couples, stated the limits of the Court's rule: 
[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the par-
ticipants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that 
the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate 
racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. 
This strong policy renders racial classification "constitutionally 
suspect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 449; and subject to the 
"most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
216; and "in most circumstances irrelevant" to any constitutionally 
acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81, 100.201 
The reference to the Japanese exclusion cases served only to under-
line the difference between the presumption and an inflexible rule. 
There were three sets of hard problems presented to the Court 
. by the Negro Revolution cases. The Court confronted two of those 
problems but it avoided a third. The :first was the extent to which 
the Court, solely by reason of the equal protection clause, would 
inhibit individual acts of discrimination. Certainly the extension 
of the state action concept was only the other side of this coin. This 
was a hard problem because, like it or not, it is here that the prin-
198. W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 19 (1956). 
199. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). 
200. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
201. 379 U.S. at 191-92. 
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ciple of equality comes into conflict with the principle of individual 
freedom-freedom to do even those acts that we most sincerely 
deplore. The second question concerned the degree to which Con-
gress is empowered, under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 
or by other constitutional provisions, to compel individuals to 
behave in a nondiscriminatory manner. Stated in other words, the 
question was how far the Court would allow Congress to go in 
choosing between equality on the one hand and freedom to dis-
criminate on the other. The Court had no difficulty whatsoever in 
deciding that Congress could ban discrimination in areas that it 
was reluctant to take under its own control. The third problem-
the unresolved one-was the extent to which a governmental body 
is free to indulge in "reverse discrimination," that is, to classify by 
race for the purpose of bestowing greater benefits, or imposing 
lesser burdens, on a minority than on a majority. This problem 
is probably the one that will have to be faced by the Warren Court's 
successor as the nation tries to avoid the doleful prophecies of 
Tocqueville. 202 
A look at the essence of the equal protection clause and its 
means of fulfillment may help to clarify the "reverse discrimina-
tion" problem, if not the solutions. The purpose of the clause was 
to prevent majorities from imposing on minorities by way of laws 
that provide different rules for the one than for the other. The 
ancient concept of equality before the 'law that underlay the Dec-
laration of Independence also supported the equal protection clause. 
If a majority is compelled to treat a minority exactly as it treats 
itself, adequate protection to minority interests is ensured by the 
self-interest of the majority. Justice Jackson stated this proposition 
in his characteristically direct fashion in Railway Express Agency v. 
New York: 203 
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal 
Goverment must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate 
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differen-
tiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is 
not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, 
and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective prac-
tical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than 
to require that the principles of law which officials would impose 
on a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens 
202. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra. I am again reminded of Justice 
Holmes' words: "Our system of morality is a body of imperfect social generalizations 
expressed in terms of emotion. To get at its truth, it is useful to omit the emotion 
and ask ourselves what those generalizations are and how far they are confirmed by 
fact accurately ascertained." 0. Hou.rES, CoLLEcrED LEGAL PAPERS 306 (1920). 
203. 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
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the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials 
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation 
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited 
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no 
better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that 
they be equal in operation.204 
Once the rule is recognized as one created for the protection of 
minorities, the role of the legislature with regard to the "benevolent 
quota" may become clearer, so long as we are also prepared to accede 
to the proposition that the legislature is the voice of the majority. 
The rule of equality commanded by the equal protection clause is 
binding on the courts. But, as with almost every other constitutional 
right, it should be treated as waivable by knowing affirmative action. 
Enactment of legislation favoring a minority may be treated as such 
a waiver by the majority of its right to equal treatment. Whether 
section 5 authorizes this waiver or whether some other provision of 
the Constitution must be found is not a pressing question, since the 
national legislature's power is now plenary except insofar as it may 
violate the provisions of the Bill of Rights or other specific restraints 
of the Constitution. Yet the Supreme Court has no right to compel 
such waiver, and the discretion to withdraw the waiver by means of 
later legislation imposing a rule of equality remains with the legis-
lature so long as the Constitution does not restrain that discretion. 
The Court is the voice of the Constitution; it is not the voice of the 
majority. 
If this analysis were accepted, there would be little problem with 
the open question of legislative power to invoke "inverse dis-
crimination." The thesis will not, however, support judicial or 
administrative use of "inverse discrimination," since neither of those 
branches-except perhaps for the President himself-is entitled to 
speak for the people, and the necessary-and-proper clause makes me 
doubt that even the President can speak for the citizenry. On the 
other hand, even the legislature cannot waive the right of the minor-
ity to equal treatment, for by definition the legislature can enact 
legislation only as a representative of the majority. There remain 
problems, of course, but they are the kind of problems that the 
Court must always face in applying the equal protection clause: 
how do you define a majority, when is a quota beneficent, and so 
on. This thesis, I submit, has been tested hundreds of times a year 
by the passage of private bills affording special treatment to a minor-
ity, usually a minority of one. 
204. ll36 U.S. at 112-lll. 
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Professor Freund has reached the same conclusion about "bene-
ficent quotas," but by a different route: 
Suppose . . . that the question of preference is raised without 
evasion. To characterize a preference as compensatory is hardly a 
satisfying answer to all the complexities. . . . 
But the concept of compensation does suggest some possible dif-
ferentiations or gradations in the problem of preference. ,vhere 
the government itself was responsible for discrimination in the past, 
there is a better case for its reverse preference now. So, too, where 
the preference is, so to speak, transitional, by way of preparing the 
members of the group to be treated as individuals. And it is the 
easier to justify a preference the less positive harm to others; easier 
to justify additional attention in schooling than a competitive 
preference in the job market. Moreover there is an ethical sense in 
which discrimination in favor of a minority is not to be equated 
with a discrimination against it .... If this is a sound moral judg-
ment, it is relevant to the judgment of the law as well, for equal 
protection of the law is at bottom the embodiment of a moral stan-
dard.205 
The essential difficulty about inroads in individual freedoms is 
not resolved, however, by appeal to the purpose or the morality of 
the equal protection clause. The problem essentially will have to 
be resolved under other provisions of the Constitution. Thus far, 
the Court has treated it too cavalierly. If Congress has authority to 
act by reason of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment or otherwise, 
it may still do so only within the confines of stated constitutional 
limitations. Clearly it cannot do so by infringing an individual's 
rights to freedom of speech, to a jury trial, to due process of law 
(with all its ambiguities), or to rights created by the "penumbra" of 
the Bill of Rights.206 In these situations it is the Court that will have 
to do the weighing, and let no one say that the Court's discretion 
is not invoked when two constitutional rights come into conflict. It 
might be asked that the Court do the weighing publicly and state 
the reasons for its choice, however difficult such a task might be. 
The invocation of absolutes is hardly responsive. 
Like the cases concerned with the Negro Revolution, the reappor-
tionment cases207 rested on the equal protection clause. But unlike 
205. Freund, The Civil Rights Movement and the Frontiers of Law, in THE NEGRO 
AMERICAN 366-67 (T. Parsons & K. Clark ed. 1966). 
206. C. PRITCHE"IT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 686 (2d ed. 1968): 
Griswold v. Connecticut [381 U.S. 479) (1965) saw the Court in a most creative 
mood. It wanted to argue with a legislature, but it had no specific constitutional 
provisions on which to base its argument. And so it created a constitutional 
foundation for its position, just as it had done with substantive due process 
three-quarters of a century earlier. 
207. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 
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the racial discrimination cases, the reapportionment cases were con-
cerned more with form than they were with substance. They repre-
sent a sterile concept of equality for the sake of equality. Given the 
premises of "one man-one vote" and "one vote-one value," the 
Court needed nothing more for its decision than the principle of 
reductio ad absurdum. There is an element of Catch-22 in the 
opinions in these cases. The Court has repeatedly said that justifiable 
deviations from the arithmetical formula will be tolerated, but it 
has yet to accept any justification proffered. 
Yet these cases must be marked as a judicial success inasmuch as 
compliance has readily occurred and the public is quiescent if not 
acquiescent. Still, if there were goals to be achieved aside from the 
possibly aesthetic one of seeing every electoral district containing the 
same number of voters, more doubts about the Court's accomplish-
ments might be expressed. I£ the Court's objective was the revival of 
state legislatures, it has failed; state legislatures remain moribund. 
I£ its objective was the transfer of power from rural to urban voters, 
it has failed; the beneficiaries of the transfer have largely been the 
reactionary suburbs. I£ its objective was to secure more meaningful 
representation, it has failed for the simple reason that arithmetic 
has no sense of community.208 
The equal protection clause was not a powerful weapon of .the 
Warren Court in the other major field of its effort-the reform of 
criminal procedure. Aside from the jury selection cases, in which the 
Court upset the selection process in every case it accepted for re-
view,209 the equal protection clause was utilized only to support the 
doctrine of Griffin v. Illinois210 which sought to ensure equality be-
tween poor and rich in the conduct of appeals,211 including access 
to appellate counsel.212 At the substantive level, the equal protection 
(1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis 
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sencock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth Gen. ksembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
208. See Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One 
T'ote", 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 219. 
209. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (M:exicans); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 
U.S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 772 (1964); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U.S. 545 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22 (1967); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 
(1967). 
210. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
211. Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960); Mccrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277 (1960); 
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963); Long v. District 
Ct. of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Williams 
v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969). 
212. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967). 
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clause was the reason for holding Virginia's miscegenation law in-
valid.213 But attacks on criminal statutes setting higher punishments 
for recidivists,214 on the imposition of a higher sentence on retrial 
than at the original trial, 215 and on the award of a new trial on the 
issue of punishment but not on the question of guilt216 were all 
rebuffed despite claims of violation of the equal protection clause. 
In the area of economic regulations and taxation, the Court al-
most invariably sustained the state classifications. With regard to 
taxes, the charge of invalid discrimination was generally rejected.217 
The only major tax case in which the taxpayer prevailed on grounds 
of improper classification was one imposing a tax at a different rate 
on domesticated foreign corporations.218 The Court sustained a regu-
lation of the sale of eyeglasses by opticians even though that regula-
tion was inapplicable to over-the-counter sales of ready-to-wear 
glasses.219 It held valid direct-action statutes against insurance com-
panies220 and a state law prohibiting sales below cost even to meet 
competition.221 According to the Court, Sunday closing laws do not 
violate the equal protection clause222-which brings to mind Holmes' 
dictum in Otis v. Parker223 in 1902: "The Sunday laws, no doubt, 
would be sustained by a bench of judges, even if every one of them 
thought it superstitious to make any day holy."224 A ban on "debt 
adjustment" except by lawyers was also held proper.22;; Moreover, 
California's legislation discriminating against Florida avocados was 
held valid, 226 as was a full-crew law for railroad trains. 227 The single 
sport was Morey v. Doud,228 in which the Court held that Illinois 
could not classify American Express along with the United States 
213. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
214. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 488 (1962). 
215. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
216. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
217. Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 
358 U.S. 522 (1959); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959). 
218. WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 177 (1968). 
219. Williams v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
220. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
221. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., 360 U.S. 334 (1959). 
222. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); 
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
223. 187 U.S. 606. 
224. 187 U.S. at 609. 
225. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
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Post Office and Western Union rather than with currency exchanges 
in the issuance of money orders. This case can be understood only 
as an expression of personal opinion by the Justices or as a require-
ment that categories be spelled out in descriptive terms rather than 
by proper names. 
The exclusion of Konigsberg from the California bar because of 
his personal history was held offensive to the principles of equal 
protection.229 But the exclusion of out-of-state lawyers was sus-
tained.230 In addition, if Griffin v. Illinois stands for the proposition 
that governments cannot discriminate between rich and poor, the 
Court in sustaining the federal reclamation acts nevertheless held it 
proper to distinguish between large landholders and small ones. 231 
On the other hand, the Court held that the equal protection 
clause prohibits a legal distinction between legitimate and illegit-
imate children for purposes of wrongful death statutes.232 It also 
found that residency requirements for welfare recipients constitute 
an invidious discrimination.233 But the bulk of the cases in which the 
clause was used to invalidate legislation concerned the exercise of 
the elective franchise. Racial designations on ballots were prohibited 
by Anderson v. Martin.234 Similarly, a law prohibiting military per-
sonnel from registering as resident voters was outlawed.23;; The poll 
tax was invalidated in one of the Court's shakiest opinions, again 
resting on distinctions between the rich and the poor.236 Further-
more, the Court found in three cases, that access to a position on the 
ballot was unduly restricted.237 Only two challenges on equal pro-
tection grounds were not accepted in this field. A prisoner's right to 
an absentee ballot while in the penitentiary was held not to be 
justified by the Constitution;238 and the power of a legislature, even 
a malapportioned one, to choose a governor after none of the can-
didates had secured a majority of the popular vote was upheld.239 
These decisions under the equal protection clause do not, how-
229. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957). 
230. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961). 
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238. McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969). 
239. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966). 
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ever, reveal the extent of the egalitarian influence on the Warren 
Court's opinions. But they were more than sufficient to call forth 
Professor Cox's judgment that, after the demand for racial justice 
which he did not include in the egalitarian influence, "[e]galitarian-
ism thus became the second powerful factor shaping current constitu-
tional decisions."240 A great deal more of the Court's business 
reflected this factor, for, as Professor Cox also said in a frequently 
quoted remark, "[ o ]nee loosed the idea of Equality is not easily 
cabined."241 In part this expansionism may have been due to the 
amorphous nature of the substance of equality-a concept which is 
not always recognized, even when it is seen. In part the expansionist 
tendency of the idea of equality may have been due to its use as 
rhetoric rather than as an idea. And the rhetoric is subject to use, 
if not capture, by anyone on any side of the question. 
Other constitutional provisions besides the equal protection 
clause command equality, and the Warren Court enforced these 
commands as well. The fifteenth amendment cases,242 including 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot248 in which Justice Frankfurter, in spite of 
himself, ignited the powder keg of reapportionment, are in this 
category. The construction given the citizenship clause of the four-
teenth amendment makes it read as a barrier to any distinctions 
between native-born and naturalized citizens,244 except, I suppose, 
with regard to eligibility for the Presidency. As I have suggested at 
length elsewhere, the decisions under the religion clauses of the first 
amendment also compel equality.245 The twenty-fourth amendment, 
banning the condition of a poll tax for voting in federal elections, 
has an egalitarian flavor that the Court adopted for its own when it 
struck down Virginia's poll tax.246 Certainly, too, the destruction of 
state power and the centralization of authority in the national gov-
ernment are part of this trend of seeking a uniform rule to govern 
240. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968). 
241. Id. 
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all. Even the void-for-vagueness cases247-which I prefer to denom-
inate the vague-for-voidness cases-are essentially in this category, 
for they held in effect that the particular legislative classification in 
question was overbroad. The case of Aptheker v. Secretary of State248 
rested specifically on that proposition, and most of the cases con-
cerned with Communists and subversives are not different in their 
constitutional question-that is, can these groups, as defined, be 
treated differently? 
What must quickly become apparent is that all governmental 
processes necessarily involve the problem of classification and can be 
analyzed in terms of the propriety of their classifications. They are all 
subject to measurement against the demands of the equal protection 
clause. And the Court seems more and more ready to address them 
in just those terms. Some bases for classification are clearly forbidden 
or, at least, are highly suspect because of explicit terms of the Con-
stitution; race is one, religion is another. But for the most part the 
test is the same as that which was put forth under the due process 
clause: Is it reasonable for a governmental body to classify in this 
way? It is not surprising that we see an appeal to the Court to engage 
in the development of "substantive equal protection," for "substan-
tive equal protection" is but another name for "substantive due 
process." Each will do as well as the other as a means of limiting or 
destroying nonjudicial governmental authority. 
"Substantive equal protection" is not a novel concept. It was 
utilized, for example, by the Taft Court in Truax v. Corrigan,249 
in which the Court held that a state law forbidding injunctions in 
labor cases was violative of the equal protection clause because in-
junctions remained available as a form of relief in other kinds of 
cases. The decision, like so many others that we have seen, was 
rendered by a Court which was divided five to four. Holmes and 
Brandeis were among the dissenters. Holmes, in keeping with his 
judicial philosophy, said: "Legislation may begin where an evil 
begins. If, as many intelligent people believe, there is more danger 
that the injunction will be abused in labor cases than elsewhere I 
can feel no doubt of the power of the legislature to deny it in such 
cases.''200 
I invoke the example of Truax v. Corrigan at this time for two 
reasons. First, it is a reminder of the fact that what we are talking 
247. See, e.g., cases cited in note 177 supra; Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). 
248. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
249. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
250. 257 U.S. at 343. 
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about is the allocation of power to, and the use of power by, the 
Court as an institution. As with the institution of the Presidency, 
the individuals change but the power accrued by the institution 
remains, until it is taken away. I do not know, but I can guess, that 
those who were anxious for Warren and company to have this dis-
cretionary power will be more wary of giving it to the Nixon Court, 
especially as it blossoms with new personnel. 
The second reason for discussing Truax is to suggest that the 
notion of equality is multifaceted. Conformity and uniformity are 
also parts of equality. But even if we were to accept the egalitarian 
goal as contemporarily stated, we should be wary of making it our 
prime value. The modern definition, as I see it, I borrow from an 
Englishman, for England too has the same forces to confront, even if 
it lacks a Supreme Court with which to do it: 
The more nearly the citizens of a country resemble one another 
in the amount of money they spend, the goods they own, the ed-
ucation they acquire and the social deference they receive, the more 
nearly perfect the country will be.251 
Yesterday, the exponents of this doctrine urged that the Supreme 
Court be the institution to determine the doctrine's applicability to 
the social, economic, and political scene in the United States. To-
morrow they may regret that this power is possessed by any govern-
mental body, including the Supreme Court. As Geoffrey Gorer 
·wrote: 
I£ mobilized public envy and resentment begrudge any social 
deference or conspicuous success outside the power hierarchy, then 
the way is being prepared for a single-value society. To the extent 
that the obverse of a desire for social justice is envy of, or resentment 
at, conspicuous success, rather than pity for conspicuous unsuccess, 
to that extent is the striving for a just state likely to result in a 
state where all power is concentrated in a single hierarchy, where 
all that will remain of a democracy will be a ritual whereby mem-
bers at the top of the power hierarchy will exchange political po-
sitions among themselves at irregular intervals. Democracy depends 
on a multiplicity of values; if only a single value is emphasized 
democracy cannot survive.252 
Those too young to remember what happened to Europe imme-
diately prior to World War II, as country after country fell under 
the thrall of equality, may yet find the allegory of Orwell's Animal 
Farm instructive and frightening. 
251. G. GORER, THE DANGER OF EQUALITY 63 (1966). 
252. Id. at 71. 
